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THE SOUL AND THE LAW

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The idea of the immortality of the soul has at all times belonged to the very essence of metaphysics. This immortal soul is evidently not that studied by psychology under the same name. Psychology, being an empirical science, cannot recognize an immortal individuality situated, so to speak, in another world. Nevertheless, it is from metaphysics that psychology has borrowed its subject, namely the soul. In doing so it was obliged to introduce certain essential modifications. But Psyche could not penetrate into the domain of a natural science without abandoning her wings—the idea of immortality. This metamorphosis has rendered her so totally different from the metaphysical soul that one may say she has completely disappeared from empirical psychology.

This abondonment of its metaphysical attributes, this change of meaning suffered by an idea in passing from metaphysics to science, may be very clearly observed in connection with another concept intimately associated with the soul, and really denoting one of its qualities, namely, the will, which exists in the immortal soul only as "free will." Empirical psychology, by treating the will in connection with causality, strips it of its attribute of freedom, as it strips the soul of its immortality; it considers the will as an element of reality, which hence has nothing but the name in common with the will known to metaphysics. The dogma of the freedom of the will

forms, with that of immortality, the second characteristic element of modern metaphysics.

The profoundly religious character of this metaphysics appears from the fact that the two dogmas in question cannot be conceived except in close relation to a third dogma, that of the existence of God. These three dogmas constitute an organic whole, the parts of which are intimately connected with one another. Metaphysics is always religion, although not necessarily a positive religion.

Modern metaphysics knows only the immortal soul of man. But the essential function of this soul begins only after death, at the moment when life (of which the soul of psychology claims to give an explanation) has ceased to exist, at least for the senses, and when therefore, there is no longer any life to explain. In this connection it would, indeed, be more nearly correct to speak of the soul of the dead as distinct from the soul of the living, of a soul existing only after death. In any case, it is indispensable in the interest of science to distinguish clearly between these two notions.

1.

It is curious to find that the ideas of primitive peoples on this subject satisfy this requirement much better than the modern. In fact, very frequently in primitive thought a relatively clear differentiation is found between the soul of the dead and that of the living. Even the Greeks had not yet conceived the idea of a single soul. *Psychê* in Homer is only the soul of the dead abiding in Hades, while he uses the term *thymos* to mean the acting force in the living man, the source of all vital functions. These two distinct notions of the soul are the result of two different tendencies of the human mind, the expression of two different attitudes toward the environment, on the one hand, the intellectual and rationalistic tendency manifested in knowing, and on the other, the emotional tendency which has its source in the will and the affective life. The former of these tendencies leads to the notion of an external world, independent of our desires and our fears, by its nature subject exclusively to the laws of causality. The other tendency gives rise to a set of notions whose real function is not to furnish an explanation of the world, and to satisfy our scientific curiosity, but to play a totally different rôle, to represent what is useful and desirable, or what

is harmful and to be feared—or, when not an individual but a collective interest is in question—what is morally good or bad, constituting in our eyes the normative order of human life. While the rationalistic tendency of the mind leads to the notion of nature as governed by the law of causality, the emotional tendency produces the notion of a society governed by moral laws or norms. These are two worlds differing as much from each other as the tendencies they reflect. It would appear that, at the beginning of evolution, the emotional tendency was by far the stronger. It would, accordingly, be unjustifiable to attribute to primitive man a natural need for objective explanation, an already developed tendency to explain the universe rationally, for even at the present time in the average civilized modern man this tendency is much weaker than the affective tendency, urging him to form judgments of value, and to seek collectively the justification of his individual interests.

Though the need of an objective explanation makes itself felt gradually in the mind of primitive man, he remains bound to his emotional and normative tendencies, and is completely mastered by them. A typical illustration is the way in which primitive man represents to himself the human soul surviving after death, and prolonging its individual existence, a notion whose social function we shall discuss later. From the fact that this representation is clearly the result of the emotional tendency, which is mentally dominant at the beginning of evolution, and is not (as in the case of the notion of the soul of the living organism which aims to be an explanation) the result of the rational tendency, we may conclude unhesitatingly that this notion of the soul of the dead, this offspring of fancy, fear, and desire, is the more ancient of the two.

Ethnographical research also points to the same conclusion. According to the ethnographical findings we may suppose that the idea of a soul existing in the living man originated in close connection with the belief, spread among all primitive tribes, that the newborn child is the reincarnation of the soul of a departed relative, so that the soul of a living body was originally the soul of the dead, i.e., of a dead ancestor. This hypothesis is based especially on the fact that the soul of the living is, in the beginning, not identified with the personality of the man in whom it resides; it plays rather the part of a tutelary genius, totally different from the personality,

whereas the soul of the dead is always identified with the man whose existence this soul continues after death. Evidently the soul as it is understood in primitive belief, is not yet what modern metaphysics understands by the same term. The soul of the dead as conceived by the primitives who originated the belief, is identical with the dead man himself, who in spite of death, continues to live in an invisible manner. The primitive man has no clear consciousness of the distinction between the soul and the body, because he can not yet distinguish between a material and an immaterial substance, as does the modern metaphysician. We believe, however, that it is permissible to apply the term, soul of the dead, to the living-dead, for it is precisely this confused and contradictory representation which has given rise to the notion of the soul as it is known to modern metaphysics. It must never be forgotten that modern thought is the outcome of primitive mentality, and that the difference between the civilized and the primitive man is only a difference of degree. Th striking analogy existing between the mental life of primitives and that of children, or certain modern neuroses, proves this.

It was only much later, at an already advanced stage of social evolution that the fusion of these two notions—soul of the dead and soul of the living—took place. The Psyche then became the expression, not only of the soul of the dead, but also of the living, *anima immortalis* became identified with the principle of life. In the course of this amalgamation, too, came the identification of the life-soul with the personality of the man animated by it. Thus was generated the notion of the soul of modern metaphysics.

Thus we find united in the modern idea of the soul two absolutely heterogeneous notions, and this original syncretism explains perfectly the paradoxical character of this idea. To this modern idea of the soul, uniting a rational and explanatory to an emotional and normative element, and being hence both moral and metaphysical by nature, corresponds the logical structure of the idea of God elaborated by modern theology. They both endeavor, in fact, to complete beyond sense experience, the explanatory function of science by tracing the chain of cause and effect to a first-cause supplied by the idea of God. This idea implies, nevertheless, in addition to a first cause, a supreme value; it represents not only absolute reality, but also absolute value. Thus the mission both of metaphysics and

of religion is to satisfy the need for a final explanation, and to supply a supreme justification for the world. It is in this idea of God that man seeks the supreme reason for his knowledge of the truth, as well as for his desire of the good, the sovereign law of nature, as well as the psychological basis of morality and of social ideology.

It is very evident that this second function, namely, the justification of the world, the laying down of rules for conduct and for the will and for social behavior confers on religion a social importance of the very first order. As religion by its very essence claims an absolute value for the norms which it establishes, it is precisely the notion of God, the essential object of religion, which gives to norms this absolute value, and hence religion necessarily assumes either a conservative or a revolutionary character, depending on the attitude which it adopts towards the existing social order, and becomes either the surest support, or the most dangerous enemy, of the state and of positive law. We can readily understand why the various theologies hesitate to recognize the ideological character, and consequently the social context of religion. They endeavor to place religion outside and above the different conflicting interests, to transport it into those serene regions where it will be sheltered from social conflicts. In other words, theology, while seeking in the realm of objective reality the recognition of its subjective claims to absolute value, will strive on occasion to place the true essence of religion outside the social sphere, removed from all conflicting forces and interests. It will be able to do this all the more easily, since religion has more than an ethical and political aspect and aims not only to give a basis for duty, but still more to reveal the ground of being.

The metaphysical dogma of the immortality of the soul, just as that of the freedom of the will, depends, therefore, on the justificatory or ethical-political function of religion, not on its explanatory or scientific function.

This explains the persistency of this idea in spite of all the success achieved by the empirical knowledge of nature over metaphysics. The idea of the freedom of the will is not claimed to express a real psychical fact, but only a postulate, a normative principle; it is only the final term of an imputation which does not seek in any way to

deny natural causality. Similarly the immortal soul is considered as having its seat in a realm not subject to the natural law of cause and effect, but to the eternal law of morality. For this reason an immortal soul, as well as a free will, is attributed only to man; the norms of law and of morality have reference in fact only to human behavior; the society constituted by these norms is composed only of human beings, and the idea of justice, which, in so far as it belongs to a specific social ideology is the only conceivable basis of the dogmas of the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul, can be applied only to the social relations of men. The idea of an immortal soul is a social ideology.

I propose to illustrate this statement by the example of Hellenic religion, which was the first in the West to formulate and systematize the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. But, since the elements or *germs* of this religion (especially the beliefs regarding the soul) present a striking analogy to the beliefs of certain primitive tribes, we must also say a few words about the latter.

2.

It is generally thought that the Hellenic religion was that of the Olympic gods, as it has been handed down to us by the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. That was indeed the dominant, or, so to speak, the official religion of Greece and of the post-Homeric period until the disappearance of Hellenic civilization. But this Olympus, of which Zeus, the all-powerful King of Heaven, was the head, at the epoch when these two immortal poems conferred on it an artistic form, exercised but a limited empire, not only in space, but also in society. It may be affirmed with certainty that this religion at that time was only that of the Greeks of Asia Minor, in the bosom of which the Homeric poems had their origin, and the religion described by the poet was merely that of the dominant classes. The contemporary religion of the metropolis and of the oppressed peasant class must not be represented as identical with the religion of Homer, although the latter ended by reacting so powerfully on the mother country as to become the prevailing religion. We must especially guard against supposing that Homer's idea of the soul as something which did not survive, was held in common by the Greeks. The Psyche having left the body has no real existence; it is but a shadow. Hades, the

abode of the dead, is peopled only with shades deprived alike of consciousness and of feeling. These souls of the dead exercise no influence on the living; they can do them neither good nor evil, and they are neither feared nor adored. They are, moreover, not eternal beings, prolonging in an after-life the existence of the dead, expecting retribution according to their deeds. Their state renders them incapable of feeling either punishment or reward. The rare passages in the *Iliad* and especially in the *Odyssey* referring to the punishment of the wicked in Hades, or to sinners who expiate their crimes in the nether world, are either remains of ancient beliefs or later interpolations. For it was only in the post-Homeric period that the belief in an immortal soul arose among the votaries of Orpheus and the Pythagoreans, in the Eleusinian mysteries and elsewhere, a soul continuing its existence after death in another abode, a belief which was taken up again and further developed by such poets as Pindar, and by philosophers such as Plato.

But a conception of the soul of the dead totally different from that of Homer is found even in the pre-Homeric epoch. This conception is, to be sure, not identical with the belief in the immortality of the soul of the post-Homeric period, but is much nearer to it than that empty existence of the shades in Hades of which Homer speaks. The chief element in the pre-Homeric belief was fear lest an anger of the dead threaten the living in different ways, unless it be appeased by various kinds of sacrifices and propitiatory acts. This belief is found among almost all primitive peoples. The souls of the dead of the pre-Homeric epoch differed from the inert shades of Homer, or the immortal souls of the Orpheans and of the Pythagoreans, in being malevolent demons appearing to men under the most various forms. It was first the corpse itself which was considered to be the seat of the soul; but it might also take up its abode in an animal; the serpent, in particular, was believed by the Greeks, as by many primitive peoples, to be an incarnation of the soul of the dead. It played an important part, even at a later epoch, in the worship of certain gods, sometimes worshipped under this form. The soul of the dead might also manifest itself in trees, stones and other inanimate objects, that is, in fetishes, and, in fact, in the historic epoch there were numerous survivals in Greece of a fetishism of trees or stones. But it is especially in the highly developed wor-

ship of corpses and tombs, a worship of which we still possess numerous evidences for the pre-historic, as well as for the historic periods, that the belief in the soul of the dead was most clearly preserved. The custom prevailing even among the most primitive peoples of burying or burning the corpse may probably be explained by the fear which the soul of the dead inspired. Nor did considerations of hygiene determine the actions of primitives—no such considerations existed for them; their only motive was the desire for protection against this soul. The numerous practices referring to the burying of the dead among primitive peoples, such as binding the hand and foot of the corpse, dismemberment, breaking the bones, covering the body with stones, etc., would seem to point likewise to this fear.

3.

The decisive fact for a sociological interpretation of the belief in the soul of the dead is that primitive man, in every case in which he admits the existence of a soul of the dead, attributes to this soul malevolent intentions towards himself. He considers the dead person as a wicked being, extremely dangerous, from whom every kind of evil may be expected, particularly diseases, and above all, death. The instinctive terror of death felt by the primitive man becomes a fear of the dead, and gives rise to the idea of a malicious "soul" which is but a "double" of the dead. But how is this transformation of the fear of death into the fear of the dead to be explained? This transfer is by no means self-evident. Animals, whose attitude may be compared to that of the savage, fear death and resist it with all their might, but no fear of the dead seems to be felt by them, not even of their own dead. It may be noticed that this fear of the dead, found among primitive peoples, is in contradiction to their immediate daily experience. For primitive man is much more accustomed to death, and to the dead, than is civilized man; to kill is with him an ordinary occurrence; he kills not only other living things, but even his own kind; he often does so for the sole reason that he fears them, with the sole object of having no longer to fear them, and on the empirical assurance that what is dead has by death been made harmless. Belief in the soul of the dead thus appears especially paradoxical in the case of the savage, for his fear

begins in exactly those circumstances which ordinarily would rob the feared object of all grounds for fear. He begins to fear after death even those for whom he had a deep affection, his father, mother, or other member of his family. Now, it is precisely the fear of the souls of the dead belonging to the nearest social group of the primitive, in particular the fear of the souls of ancestors, which forms the essence of his belief in the soul of the dead. The transfer of the fear of death to the dead therefore, appears unnatural, especially in the case of primitive man, and calls for an explanation.

This may be found in the peculiar mechanism of primitive thought. Death, which he fears, the primitive is incapable of representing to his mind as an abstraction. The tendency to materialize his ideas can be seen, moreover, in all domains of his mental life, and causes him to see in the dead the incarnation of death itself. Death is for him the dead man. It resides in the dead; it is the mortal substance. And, as this mortal substance spreads death by contagion, primitive man's idea is that the corpse must not be approached, it must be buried or destroyed as soon as possible. Therefore, the idea that he forms of the soul of the dead is the naïve expression of his idea of death.

But the simple transfer of the fear of death to the dead, or to the soul of the dead which now becomes the object of that fear, as being the possible cause of death, can in no wise furnish a full explanation of the phenomenon which the belief in the soul of the dead constitutes. It must, indeed, be remembered that primitives attribute to the souls of the dead, especially to those of dead ancestors, not only death as such, but in addition every form of disaster in individual or in collective life, such as sickness, failure in hunting, bad harvests, sterility in animals or people, etc., in other words, events which have nothing to do with death directly.

It must be added that, if on the one hand the primitive fears evil from the soul of the dead, on the other, he hopes for good. Now this beneficent and protective function of the soul of the dead cannot be explained by the fear of death and its transfer to the dead. Granting that this protective function of the soul of the dead plays only a secondary part, and that the feeling of love and of gratitude which it produces in the primitive cannot be compared in intensity to the fear felt for the malevolent influence, still it is none the less true

that this second element belongs also to the religious ideology we are now studying; it constitutes, together with fear, the specifically ambivalent attitude of the primitive man towards the dead, and the soul of the dead.

But another fact must be borne in mind; a thorough analysis of the results obtained by ethnographical research shows that the transfer of the fear of death to the dead man does not, in fact, take place *every* time the primitive finds himself in the presence of death; that is, every time he witnesses the passage from life to death. The transfer varies greatly according to the manner of dying, the intensity with which the death is felt, and whether the dead is an animal, or a human being belonging to a particular social group. A critical analysis of the abundant documentation available proves that the differences are above all determined by social factors. It is a well ascertained fact that primitive man's attitude to the dead belonging to his own group is different from that assumed towards the dead of a strange or possibly hostile group. The fear of the soul of the dead, and as a consequence, the representation of that soul (which in fact is indistinguishable from this fear) is particularly noticeable in everything connected with the corpse; for example, in the duty of burying the dead, of doing him honor, etc. These different prescriptions are related, moreover, to the measures of defence which primitive man takes against death, and which, although presenting totally different characters have fear for their common origin. It is for this reason that among almost all primitive peoples, leaving the corpse without burial, or profaning it, is considered one of the gravest crimes, capable of provoking the greatest wrath in the soul of the dead, and of exciting his particularly formidable vengeance. Just as the Acheans of the *Iliad* held it a sacred duty to bury their companions in arms, but on the contrary, quite legitimate to abandon the corpses of the Trojans to dogs and birds-of-prey, so do certain primitive tribes today still make an analogous distinction between the dead fallen on the field of battle. It is probable that originally primitive man in no wise feared the dead if they belonged to a strange or enemy tribe, failing to attribute to them souls capable of exercising malevolent action.

It may, perhaps, be conjectured that in primitive times savages were conscious only of a feeling of pleasure in killing their enemies;

while the murder of a man belonging to their own group produced terrible anguish, due to a fear, not of social punishment, but of the vengeance of the dead. And this fear was sufficient to prevent murders within the same social group. The religious ideology of the belief in the souls of the dead was, probably, originally limited to the man's own social group. It was only at a much later stage of human development, and only when the social conscience had been considerably enlarged, that the murder of a man belonging to a strange group, that is of an enemy, ceased to produce exclusively agreeable sensations, ceased to be considered an honorable act, and the murderer began to fear also the soul of the enemy he had killed. The idea that the slain enemy also possessed a soul capable of revenging itself on its murderer seems to date from a relatively recent period, for, in its application to a strange or enemy group, the ideology of the belief in the soul of the dead seems much less effectual. While the murder of a man belonging to the same group as the murderer was considered unatonable, and the latter as fatally condemned to the vengeance of the dead man, it was allowable to shelter oneself from the vengeance of the murdered enemy by going through a few relatively simple ceremonies of purification. The fear of the dead enemy, and consequently the notion of his soul and of his power, is noticeably weaker than in the case of the soul of the dead of his own group.

The part played by social factors in the belief in the soul of the dead appeared with special clearness among tribes that still showed some traces of matriarchal organization, where for example the corpse is only taboo for the relatives on the mother's side, and, in consequence, is formidable only for them, while paternal relations might approach it without apprehension. It is quite evident that the soul of a dead chief, of a medicine-man, or any other important personage of the social group, inspired greater fear than the soul of an ordinary individual. Indeed, there were no social differences within the family group that were not reflected in the belief in the soul of the dead. Among many primitive tribes the murder of a man carried with it the duty of vengeance, a duty commanded by the soul of the dead man, but such was not the case for the murder of a woman. As for children, they might be put to death at their birth with impunity, without giving rise to any fear of revenge from their

souls. It followed that among certain peoples the corpses of women and children were not buried with the same care as those of men, but were sometimes simply thrown into the bush, so also, and with stronger reason, those of slaves, who generally belonged to a strange and enemy tribe captured during a combat.

The influence of social factors in the formation of the belief in the soul of the dead appears in a still more striking manner in social relations to animals, that is to say, in a form of society which has ceased to exist for civilized man. To be sure, primitive man believed in the existence of a soul in dead animals, but, whenever he did so, he always seemed to associate it with a human, or quasi-human soul. This is a phenomenon intimately connected with totemism, the characteristic of which is that it establishes between a particular social group and a particular animal a social relationship. The fundamental law of totemism forbids the killing of the totem-animal; when, however, for any reason whatever, the slaughter of a totem-animal becomes inevitable, for instance when it is required for food, the act is accompanied by expiatory ceremonies analogous to those practised in the case of the murder of an enemy, for the vengeance that is feared from the soul of a murdered man is also feared from the soul of the animal killed.

4.

The facts which we have now set forth, and which show the influence of social factors on the formation of the belief in the soul of the dead, authorize us to believe that the transformation of the fear of death into the fear of the dead, and the consequent representation of a formidable soul of the dead, corresponds to needs, not individual, but social. The fear of the soul of the dead is no simple natural instinct, but a definite aspiration determined and directed by essentially social forces.

It is therefore obvious that the formation of a belief in the soul of the dead presupposes the existence—even if in rudimentary form —of a social group or order. The specific function of this primitive order consists in the protection of certain elementary interests, above all, of the life of the members of the community constituted by this order. It shows itself—as is seen in every social evolution at its beginning—in an almost instinctive reaction against any injury di-

rected against this interest. The necessity for this reaction in the conscience of the members of the group takes the form of the principle of retribution, which thus becomes an element of their conscience, a conscience which has from the very beginning a social character. This social character of the primitive conscience finds expression in a phenomenon noticed by all close observers: in the complete solidarity between the individual and his group. But because life is the most precious possession—in fact the sole possession—of primitives, and the death of an individual is for them the most terrible event, because felt by them as an essential loss to the group, murder represents the most ancient crime and capital punishment the most ancient penalty.

He who kills another shall himself be slain—this is the most ancient norm. The principle of retribution which it lays down is found already in the most elementary social organization. It is the basic rule of reciprocal treatment of the members of the group in so far as this treatment is concerned with social order. And because the principle of retribution represents a legal rule, the social order had from its origin the character of a legal order.

The principle of retribution directs not only the social behavior of primitive man, but also his attitude towards nature, or, more exactly, towards what the civilized man understands by nature, unified by a common bond of objective causality. Primitive man has not yet acquired the notion of causality, and lacking it, most readily connects events by the principle of retribution. This social principle dominates his social conscience. Only in relation to this principle can he represent his little world to himself. His very limited need of explanation is entirely dominated by the tendency of his mind to materialize forces, qualities and conditions of objects; a special form of this tendency to materialize is the personification of such forces and qualities. In the presence of phenomena which are for him sources of joy or of pain, he does not ask *how* they have been produced, but *who* has given them birth. Primitive man thinks that by a suitable attitude on his part he can gain the favor of what we call the forces of nature, and that on the contrary he may lose their favor by behavior unpleasing to them. He invokes these forces by word and gesture expressing his desires, for he supposes that these will be understood, and that although themselves invisible,

these forces will perceive his conduct and will judge it according to social criteria, that is, with respect to moral values, and that they will regulate their own conduct accordingly. This attitude of the primitive towards the forces of nature appears especially clearly in what is called—improperly enough—his magic. It is precisely because the primitive behaves toward these forces exactly as he does toward human beings that we cannot admit that for him these are objective and impersonal, as the preanimistic theory teaches. If it be true that primitive man considers these magical forces as objective elements, and believes he can obtain the desired result without the intervention of superhuman beings by virtue of words or gestures alone, that is, by what are called magic ceremonies, it would be necessary to admit that the primitive already possesses the notion of objective causality. This can hardly be admitted, and certain ethnologists who reject the animistic interpretation do not themselves admit it, because they rightly consider that the idea of a nature ruled by the law of causality is incompatible with primitive mentality.

5.

The attitude of primitive man to nature goes to prove that he conceives his relation to her forces as governed by the law of retribution. The decisive importance of this principle appears in all primitive myths. The legend of the flood, common to so many peoples and which explains a natural catastrophe as a punishment, is only one particularly characteristic example of this tendency. Nature for the primitive is only an extension of society, and is, therefore, like the latter, ruled by the principle of retribution. This principle was perhaps the origin of the modern idea of causality, and this idea was the outcome of a slow evolution, which we need not now examine. The social interpretation of nature constitutes the true essence of what is designated by the term *animism*. This theory, in spite of certain restrictions and modifications required by the first form it received from Tylor, remains today, in spite of the criticisms of which it has lately been the object, the best explanation, because most in accordance with primitive mentality.

It would indeed be astonishing if the belief in the souls of the dead of which we have just shown the social origin had not from the very beginning some connection with the principle of retribution

dominating the primitive conscience. And this connection appears as soon as we endeavor to interpret sociologically, and no longer purely psychologically, the complex of representations, acts of worship and of defence centering around the idea of the anger of the dead man's soul.

The sociological, and therefore objective, interpretation of the belief in the soul must certainly not lose sight of the subjective conceptions that primitive man may himself have had on this subject. But we must nevertheless beware of adopting them such as they are, and of according to them the value of a scientific explanation. The question, whose answer we are now seeking, is why the soul of the dead man is irritated. Two causes are generally accepted, envy and revenge. The first is usually formulated more or less in the following manner: primitive man passionately prizing life imagines that the dead man regrets dying, that he is angry because he is obliged to leave this world, and is consequently jealous of the living. The other motive given is that the dead man is irritated because of an offence he thinks he has suffered, either that a suitable burial has not been given him, or that some other rite prescribed for the dead has been omitted, or, finally, that people speak ill of him. The soul of the dead desires to take revenge; it is essentially as the spirit of revenge that it is dreaded. But not only may the soul of the dead be irritated by an offence which it thinks it has suffered after death; the anger of the soul is especially to be feared when the dead man has been assassinated, for the soul desires revenge for the evil done to it, or more exactly done to the living man, whose place it has taken.

It will be easily admitted that the first of these motives to which the anger of the soul is attributed, namely the envy it feels towards the people who survive it, is absolutely inadequate to explain the profound terror dominating the entire psychical life of primitive man. That the idea of the anger of the soul of the dead is the result, and not the cause of the primitive terror, must not be forgotten; it is the result of his terror of death. And indeed, the result must have a certain connection with the causes producing it. The panic terror which the primitive has of death can hardly produce in his mind a spectre, whose envy, at most, he had to fear, while in daily life he is a prey to far more dangerous feelings. If he transfers to the dead, or more

exactly to certain of the dead, his fear of death, if he fears death in these dead, it is because he fears lest death may come to him from the dead man by way of retaliation.

But it may be objected that the case of a violent death is an exception, and that a natural death furnishes the dead man with no reason for revenge. The answer is that the revenge of the death may be excited likewise, as the results of extensive ethnographical research show, by any other injury of which he may have been the victim during his lifetime, and even, at a later stage of evolution, by any reprehensible act directed against the social order of the group. It is especially so when the dead man was the chief of a group, that is, when during his lifetime he was the guardian of that order. Moreover—and this is a decisive element—the idea of a natural death is as foreign to the mind of the primitive as that of a natural birth. He is inclined to attribute death in every case to a bad spirit, that is to the soul of the dead, whether this action has been directly caused by a bad spirit as a retributive act, or has been caused indirectly by the magical evil deeds of a living enemy making use of such an evil spirit.

Every death is considered by primitive man as a murder and constitutes in his eyes not a natural, but a social event. The death of a member of the group is in the eyes of the primitive either a legitimate revenge on the part of the soul of the dead, or the crime of some living enemy calling in its turn for revenge. For the soul of that dead person will take revenge itself, either by inflicting on its murderer illness or death, or by exciting its nearest relations to take revenge on its behalf, as does the soul of the assassinated King of Denmark in *Hamlet*. And in the latter case the neglect by the living of the desire of the soul for vengeance will again draw down on the living the direct vengeance of the dead, outraged by their forgetfulness.

It is, therefore, vengeance that the primitive fears above all, and in all circumstances from the dead, even from him, who according to our civilized ideas has died a natural death. Vengeance, as a sociological interpretation of facts, gives the only adequate explanation of the fear which the soul of the dead inspires. The essential function of this soul is retribution. It is a retaliation realized on earth by the soul of the dead, not in an after-life. The dualism between the terrestrial and a transcendental world does not exist for the primitive, who considers the soul of the dead as still belonging to his social group, as

an invisible member of his community. And since the essential function of this soul is retribution, the belief in the soul of the dead has a legal as well as a moral significance. For morality is nothing more than the constituent order of society, especially in the case of a primitive society, in which as yet no distinction exists between morality and law.

It is obvious from the point of view of this sociological interpretation, that is, from an objective one of facts, that the first cause of this dreaded vengeance of the dead could not have been the non-observance of some prescription concerning the treatment of the corpse, or of the worship due to the dead, as would appear to be the general opinion; for such prescriptions pre-suppose already the fear of the soul of the dead. The non-observance of funeral rites is only a secondary factor here for a sociological explanation, but a factor which may play, psychologically, that is, in primitive man's conscience, a principal part. From the sociological point of view the principal cause of the vengeance of the dead can only be a wrong done to him during his lifetime and which has not been expiated before his death. Such is, from a sociological point of view, the decisive motive, which, although perhaps not consciously perceived by primitive man himself, still sufficiently explains the need felt by him to appease the dead man, or what is the same thing, the soul of the dead.

6.

Thus alone can we explain why all the ideas at the base of the belief in the soul and the worship of the dead among the Greeks appear laid down with particular precision in the institutions for the revenge of blood and the expiation of murder. In Greece the duty of avenging the murder of a blood relation devolved on his family. It was an obligation towards the soul of the murdered man, which claimed vengeance as its right. In the fifth and sixth centuries at Athens, the belief was that the soul of a man who had died a violent death was irritated by the crime, irritated not only against the murderer, but also against those who were bound to avenge the crime, if they failed in their duty. The soul became an avenging spirit, it was itself the spirit of vengeance.

When the action of the tribunals of the state replaced the private vengeance of blood, the duty of the relatives became limited to the

accusation of the murderer. And if the latter managed to escape beyond the frontiers of the state, he was saved not only from the chastisement of the state, whose juridical competence did not extend beyond its frontiers, but also from the soul of the murdered man, it also having no power beyond the borders of its own state. This fact proves clearly the bond existing between the idea of the soul and the idea of law. This bond appears also very distinctly in the purification ceremony to which the murderer had to submit. The officiating priest poured the blood of a sacrificed animal over the murderer's hands. The meaning of this act, according to the Greeks, was that the shedding of blood could efface blood shed. The stain that the blood of the victim effaced was the anger of the soul of the assassinated man. For it was from the soul, according to the ideas of the primitive Greeks, that the principle of retaliation emanated.

The close bond existing between the idea of a soul manifesting itself after death, and the idea of retribution, appeared in the important part played by the Erinnys in Greek mythology. They are among the most ancient divinities of law, they are the executors of retribution, and they are in this capacity the servants of Zeus, the supreme guardian of law. At their origin, in the pre-Homeric period, in an epoch when law was limited to the vengeance taken for blood spilt, they were little more than agents charged with carrying out vengeance on the assassins, and appeared—in accordance with the patriarchal character of the primitive juridical community—as the Erinnys of the assassinated father or mother. The penal principle of blood for blood was established in Greece for parricide, which was held to be the most terrible of all crimes. The parents are the true bearers of the Erinnys, it was on these that all the ancient procedure for avenging crimes of blood devolved. It was under the sign of the Erinnys that the trial in cases of bloody crimes was conducted, and with the invoking of whom the trials commenced. The accused when acquitted offered sacrifices to them, for it was they who had acquitted him. These Erinnys had their origin in the worship of the dead. We know, thanks to the works of Rohde, that the Erinnys of a murdered man were nothing else but the irritated soul of that man, itself taking its own vengeance. It was only owing to a later transformation that these souls of the dead became, under the name of Erinnys, lower goddesses of the justice of retribution.

This transformation went on side by side with social evolution. The belief in the soul of the dead, that is, the belief that the soul of the dead revenges itself on account of an injury done to it, corresponded to a social organization in which the family community of blood constituted the supreme juridical community. The belief in the soul of the dead was a family religion, for its object was the soul of the father, or of the mother. With the extension of the social group beyond the family, that is, as the integration and centralization of society progressed, a corresponding integration and centralization of the religious ideology may be observed. Instead of the household gods, which were the deified souls of dead ancestors, a relatively restricted number of supreme divinities appeared, who became the gods of the enlarged social community. These gods were essentially terrestrial gods, and the most ancient were females. If the existence of gods is generally admitted only for this later stage of religious evolution, and if the worship of these gods is alone considered the first manifestation which may be termed religion, it is because the religious ideology corresponding to this stage is relatively nearer to our modern conception of religion. In this sense it may be said that the most ancient religion known in Greece was a religion of the forces of the earth, and that the most ancient divinity was Gaia, adored later under the name of Demeter. It was the personification of the earth in which the dead were buried. The social function of the ancient souls of the dead passed thenceforth to the earth who had become the central divinity. Numerous facts seem to prove that Gaia, like Demeter, who succeeded her, was still a divinity of justice, and that the beneficent action of the earth, in a general way fertility, was considered an attribute of the retributive function. Just as a bad harvest or a drought was interpreted as a punishment, so a good harvest and numerous progeny were held to be rewards granted by the goddess. It is quite natural that this evolution of religion is intimately connected with the modification in the social structure, and especially with the transition to agricultural life. The central divinity of the earth no longer limited her action, as the ancient souls of the dead had theirs, to avenging a personal offence, she now avenged all offences offered to any member of the community. Thus also did the jurisdiction of the central authorities replace private vengeance progressively in the social sphere. But the ancient souls of the dead were long in disappearing from the popular

conscience; they continued to exist, beside and below the gods of the earth, under the form of demons and all kinds of spirits.

7.

With some recent authors the idea prevails that the conception of justice was quite foreign to the gods of Homer. In my opinion, this is erroneous. Is not the fundamental idea of the gods of the epics the idea of divine retribution? In the *Iliad*, it is the judgment of Troy, punished for the crime committed by Paris in carrying off Helen, which was a grave violation of the laws of hospitality. In the *Odyssey* the final aim is the infliction of the punishment to which the gods had condemned the wicked courtiers of Penelope. But even if these fundamental ideas be set aside, many passages in the two epics bear witness that the essential point in the Homeric religion was the belief that the Olympic gods, and above all Zeus, allowed no crime to go unpunished; that the punishment was inflicted, not in another world, but in this; that even if this punishment were delayed and did not reach the guilty one, sooner or later it would be suffered by his family, or his whole people. If the gods of Homer are generally considered immoral, or at least amoral, it is, first, because they are united in their mutual relations by the same passions as men. But this is a simple consequence of anthropomorphic polytheism which in general is quite in keeping with the idea that the gods represent justice with respect to man. The absolute monarch, whose position as regards his subjects is not without analogy to that of the gods, is also the representative of the juridical order, without, however, being himself submitted to it. But the principal argument in support of the opinion that the gods of Homer were not the incarnation of the idea of morality and justice is the fact, constantly insisted upon, that the gods were equally the source of evil, and that it was especially the will of the gods which inspired the wicked actions of men. For my part, I do not attach special importance to the many passages in the *Iliad*, and still more frequent in the *Odyssey*, bearing witness to a rudimentary conception in which an attempt is made to liberate the gods from all responsibility for evil. This tendency is manifestly in contradiction to the prevailing conception in their works, and this conception results necessarily from the belief that the gods are not only sovereignly just, but also—at least as regards man—almighty. For, if everything depends

on the Divine will, it must be considered as the source of evil. The resulting contradiction is not peculiar to the religion of the Olympian gods; it is of necessity inherent in every religious ideology whatsoever. It is, in fact, the classical conflict between the two fundamental qualities which the idea of God, even though it be the most highly developed, even if it be the Christian idea, tends necessarily to unite; and this conflict is scarcely removed by opposing to the divinity considered as the personification of good, a divinity considered, on the contrary, as the personification of evil, by opposing Ormuzd to Ahriman, or hell to heaven; the Homeric religion knew nothing of this formal dualism, but Plato's philosophy already contains a hint of it.

The arguments I have briefly summarized, and which are brought forward today to prove the indifference of the Homeric religion with regard to the requirements of morality and justice, are therefore not sufficiently convincing to shake the more ancient conception according to which the religious belief of the Greeks of Homer was a belief in justice and order governing the world. And in fact, the essential function of the Olympian gods, and particularly of the king of the gods, Zeus, was retaliation, a function inherited by him from the terrestrial divinities who had preceded him, and who in their turn had inherited it from the souls of the dead.

We have here the explanation of the idea Homer had of the souls of the dead; on this subject we find in his work traces of more ancient religious beliefs, which must have previously played a much more important part. But as the souls of the dead had no longer any social function in the system of the Olympian gods, they had therefore lost all real life, and were thenceforth nothing more than the vain and unsubstantial shades of which the Homeric poems speak.

8.

The belief in the immortality of the soul in the post-Homeric period, with the idea of a judgment of the dead, although profoundly different from the pre-Homeric worship of the dead, corresponding as it did to a different idea of the soul, was still, like the latter, the instrument of the idea of retribution. The origin of this belief in the immortality of the soul may be traced to the sixth, and perhaps even to the seventh century. It constituted the basis of the wisdom of the

Orphics, as well as the foundation of the Pythagorean wisdom; the characteristics of both were essentially ethical-religious. The Orphics and the Pythagoreans taught that the soul was imprisoned in a mortal body, that by asceticism the body must be prevented from getting the mastery over the soul, but that after death the soul descended into the netherworld, there to be judged for the sins which had defiled it during life. The idea of a judgment of the dead in the netherworld, an idea especially developed among the Orphics, is somewhat related, though not quite reconciled to the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. The soul does not remain in the netherworld. The expiation it endures there is not the end of its torments. It is obliged to return to the light, and to the terrestrial life, to commit again in new incarnations new sins which in their turn are to be expiated. If the soul is the prisoner of the body, it is a punishment for faults committed during a previous existence. The only possible significance of the doctrine of the transmigration of souls is the idea of retributive justice or retaliation.

It is Orphic and Pythagorean influence that we find later in Pindar's ideas on the soul, on the migration of souls, and their judgment in an after-life. But this influence is most clearly felt in Plato, whose philosophy is the principal source of the modern doctrine of immortality. The fundamental thought of Plato in the post-Socratic period is essentially a theologically religious thought, that is, ethical-political, having a metaphysical tendency. It was ethical and political considerations which induced Plato to incorporate the dogma of immortality into his philosophical system. This dogma is used by Plato essentially in the support of the idea of justice. Three of his most important dialogues, the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic* end with a passage in which the belief in immortality is closely connected with the realization of retributive justice. The dialogue specially devoted to the question of immortality, the *Phaedo*, contains at its close a description of the life to which the soul goes after death. The irresistible impression made by this passage is that the description of the after-life, inspired by Orphic and Pythagorean conceptions, constitutes the culminating point of Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and determines its entire character. This doctrine is based on the idea that, after the judgment of the souls, some are punished for the sins committed during life, others rewarded for the justice of which

they have given proof. And as the *Phaedo*, the dialogue consecrated to the immortality of the soul, closes with the glorification of the idea of justice, so does the dialogue treating of justice, the *Republic*, close with the assertion of the immortality of the soul. Having proved that the soul has something immortal, that the supreme good of the soul is justice, Plato finishes his work by a vision of the after-life deeply penetrated by the idea of retribution. Judges have their places on the threshold of the invisible world; they direct to the right, to the upper spheres of bliss, the souls of the just, but to the left, to the lower regions of innumerable torments, the souls of the unjust. And the closing words of the *Republic* reveal with the greatest possible clearness the ethical-political significance of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and its immortality. The sense of these final words is in substance the following: He who follows my advice and believes that the soul is immortal will, knowing what awaits him in an after-life, lead here a just life, and consequently will be happy, not only here below, but especially in the life beyond.

9.

The two stages through which the idea of the soul passed in the Greek religion as the authority realizing retribution, and then as the object on which the retribution is realized—characterize in a general way the evolution of all belief in the soul. However different these two conceptions may be, nevertheless they agree from the social point of view. They both serve the ideology of the preservation of the existing social order, and have therefore a distinctly conservative character: the one by its strong reaction against whoever violates positive law; the other offering to those whom this law discontents the consoling perspective of justice hereafter.

The Jews in the beginning knew nothing of the immortality of the soul. But on their return from exile after the loss of their political independence, the belief grew among them in the coming of a Messiah who should re-establish the Jewish Kingdom, a Kingdom in which absolute justice should reign. He would establish it, not in heaven but here below, by putting an end to the foreign domination under which the Jews groaned. In close connection with this belief in the coming of the Messiah another idea grew up which offers a certain analogy with the idea of the immortality of the soul, from

which, however, it considerably differs: the belief in the resurrection of the body, and in a final judgment which should assure eternal life to the just in the Kingdom of God, and condemn the unjust to eternal death. The idea of a future Kingdom realizing justice on earth by the suppression of existing political power had a radically revolutionary character. This justice, also one of retaliation, of resentment, consisted in the complete overthrow of all existing conditions: the blind shall see, those that see now shall become blind; the hungry shall be satisfied, those that are fed shall be hungry; the poor shall be rich, the rich poor. This Messianic Kingdom with the resurrection of the body represents a totally different type of justice from that which puts off the realization of these aspirations to an after-life, and which of necessity must proclaim the immortality of the soul: on the one hand, the terrestrial body, on the other, the transcendental soul. Nothing can better illustrate the real nature of this soul, its deep significance and its social function, as a specific ideology of law, than this great historical opposition between a conservative conception and a revolutionary ideal.

FROM MARXISM TO SOPHIOLOGY*

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I cannot help feeling that I am standing here before you as a living paradox; in my youth I was one of the leaders of Russian Marxism, and today I am here as a devoted priest of the Holy Orthodox Church, an Orthodox theologian, and more than that, a definite representative of the so-called sophiological doctrine. I do not intend to touch the personal and the intimate aspects of this change, the definite happenings on "the road to Damascus." These were miraculous revelations, and such are really the most important and decisive happenings in the lives of all of us. I feel that I am invited only to describe my *intellectual* journey, because this evolution was a long and uninterrupted process, a logical development of definite motives and problems, which have been pointed out and made clear in the whole series of my books. Every step I not only personally experienced, but I philosophically investigated and logically justified it. I might be compared to the plan of a building which was many times examined, verified, corrected, and finally changed into a quite opposite type. What in this plan is the fundamental motive which was leading me and my adherents to these spiritual upheavals and reversals in our search for truth?

The motive is one which is characteristic for many Russians who are seeking for a general outlook on life, a *Weltanschauung*. It is an endeavor to connect dogmatic or theoretical ideas and practical conclusions, to give an answer to the "cursed questions": what is to be done for the salvation of our native country, of the world, of everyone?—and this is typically Russian.

The Russian soul thirsts for the wholeness of life, and above that for the wholeness of a religious outlook, although this thirst is very often satisfied by a substitute, and sometimes by an anti-religious religion; nevertheless even in this case, it is still a religion. This was the meaning to me and my generation of the doctrines of socialism, and particularly of Marxism, and this same meaning is now sought in Russia with her anti-religious fanaticism against all religious religion.

* An address delivered at Columbia University, October 27, 1936.

Religion is now proclaimed in Russia to be an opiate for the people, but there is, of course, one great exception, the Marxian creed—an atheistic religion; this militant paganism is not regarded as an opiate, but is appreciated as an excellent stimulant for the people.

Thus, at that time, I was a devoted and pious layman of the Marxist religion. I did not find the chief importance of this complex of ideas in the purely scientific side of the doctrines. I was a scholar, a professor of political economy, and I certainly knew the works of Marx and Engels no less well than do innumerable people who now stand on guard for Marxism. Nevertheless, for me as for many of these others, the most important things were not the deductions of science, which are always difficult to understand and accessible to criticism, but the religious dogmatics, the cornerstones of the faith. Because of this I was a theologian of Marxism.

My theology consisted of a series of dogmatic articles of a creed, of certain theoretical ideas and practical conclusions, which were connected in spite of their evident and naïve contradictions. I need to mention only a few of these. 1) According to the philosophy of knowledge, man is an accidental conjunction of material atoms. Therefore he is able, not only to know, but to transform the Universe. Man's consciousness is but a superstructure of economics. Therefore he is called to possess the earth through his knowledge. 2) In the doctrine as to man, man is but a species of monkey; therefore he is to love his neighbor! He depends in his thinking upon the economic organization to which he belongs, or upon the degree of development of the productive forces. His ideas are a reflex of his economic life, and have no independent significance as such; therefore he is called to prepare and enter into "a kingdom of freedom," to make a "jump" from "prehistory" into "history," that means, into an earthly paradise, or the Kingdom of God upon earth. 3) In the sphere of morals, the personality of a man does not really exist, because classes or social groups alone have reality; there exists neither immortality nor spirit, only body with its physical needs; a man is led, not by personal, but only by class desires. Therefore he is called to heroic duties and revolutionary actions. Furthermore not love but hatred is the law of life, and in spite of this the struggle between the classes will bring to humanity in the future not only solidarity apart from classes, but even mutual love. No personality is recognized, but in spite of this fact

there is proclaimed the obligatory recognition of an infallible authority—of personal leadership which so ironically reminds us of the canonization of saints in the Church, or even the Vatican, etc., etc.

I could continue at great length with similar examples of the contradictory dogmas of the new paganism which was for a time my own belief, and which is now the official and obligatory religion in Russia, and a voluntary, though less common, belief in other countries. For my fate it was very important that such acute contradiction existed between the dead dogmas and the heroic feeling concerning life and death. The morals, metaphysics, apocalypsis, and eschatology of Marxism were not harmoniously connected. They were united by a superstitious faith which was not accessible to free and sincere criticism. Nevertheless, despite all barriers, criticism willingly and unwillingly continued its work of liberation.

This task of critical investigation of my Marxian or, in more general terms, my atheistic creed, was very long and complicated, but it was carried on with a good intellectual conscience. From the beginning it was obvious that the investigation could not be limited to the field of economic science. Philosophy in a broad sense, the history of religion, the history of Christian dogma, together with the history of social doctrines in ancient and modern times—all this offered a vast and practically limitless field, which had to be ploughed by merciless, and yet honest and sincere criticism. Unavoidably, instead of Marx and Engels (at first along with them), my guides on the path to the Kingdom of Truth became the really great thinkers: the great Greek philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus; the great Fathers of the Church, Origen, the Cappadocians, Augustine, and others; also the representatives of the new philosophy, especially of German Idealism, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel; and later some Russian thinkers, Vladimir Solovyev, Dostoyevsky, etc. The indisputable result of the whole journey was to be found in the complete ruin of the dogmatics of Marxism, because of their naïve and childish character. This creed had been dogmatic in the bad sense of the word, for it was full of contradictions and superstitions. It was merely blindness and, to take it at its best, it was merely a long series of philosophical misunderstandings, a kind of philosophical obscurantism, a real impossibility for a philosophy.

I must therefore insist that my change of mind was based, neither

on a change of social sympathies, nor on a kind of "religious mania" (as it was probably explained). The change became unavoidable because of intellectual dialectics, and a clear understanding that the right path of social idealism leads directly to religious faith. This was not idolatry or superstition, but a philosophically responsible belief in God as spirit and love. This had at the same time the voice of my heart and the witness of my intellect. I became a Christian philosopher.

My return to the faith of my ancestors, the Holy Orthodox Church, was but a natural consequence of this change of mind. So too was my decision to serve this newly discovered faith as a priest at a time when the open confession of faith became inevitable, because of the cruel persecution which religion was undergoing. What did I find on my return as a prodigal son to the house of the father? I found a complete philosophy of life, a complete answer to all the questions which had tormented me during my life. I had been seeking an understanding of the meaning of life. What was the place of man in nature, and of nature in man? What was man in the whole complex of his capacities as a thinking being, endowed with will and intellect, called to creative effort in the world, sensible to beauty and art, and capable of love, individual and social at the same time, spirit and flesh, angel and animal in one life? What is the meaning of this enigmatic tangle of contradictions?

The unique and satisfactory solution of this philosophical and religious riddle is found in the Christian dogma that man is the image of God, and in the God-manhood, which defines the whole relationship of God to man, and his place as a centre and representative of the whole of nature. Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. The Word was made flesh, God became man, the Logos united the human and divine natures. He is God-man, and the whole of mankind participates in this God-manhood. This universal fact of the incarnation of Christ is the answer of faith, for it is at the same time the single convincing answer of philosophy to the riddle of man.

I can merely touch briefly a series of the chief ideas of the Christian philosophy which replaced in my mind the modern paganism. Man, as well as the world, cannot be understood of themselves as only matter or energy. Even before Christianity, this was obvious to Aristotle in his doctrine as to the first cause which moved the world. The world

is a *creation* which receives its existence from the energy placed in it from outside, or from above, from the Creator, from God. This dependence shows not merely the absolute power of God, but an inner connection with God, a correspondence or likeness which exists in the relations between the Creator and the creation. The divine life and energy is a true foundation of the existence of the world, even in its natural being. This energy is named in the Holy Scriptures the Divine Wisdom, the Holy Sophia, sometimes the Divine Glory. In Proverbs VIII, 23, this Wisdom says of herself: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way. . . . I was set up from everlasting," and this Wisdom is, I should say, a divine part of the created world, its very foundation. The eternal seed of the divine life and energy was immersed in a process of becoming, since it was its inner reality, motive, strength and final aim.

This world is not lacking an inner goal, is not accidental, but it is inwardly defined in its development and life. It has its reason and aim, it is ἐντελέχεια, in the language of Aristotle. This world is not an accidental combination of different energies; it is a whole, an organic union of them with the centre in man, as the Wisdom of God says (*op. cit.*, VIII, 31), "My delights were with the sons of men." Man is the microcosm of the world.

If man is a cosmic being and belongs to this world, the world in its turn is included in man, has in him its highest summit, and a last and highest generalization. The world *is* man, and man is the world. In that sense the world is godlike in man, the Wisdom of God illuminates the world through man, who is the highest goal of creation. Man was created after the image of God to be a "created god" in the world, to have dominion over it. This call had to be realized by man through his self-revelation or self-realization of himself as of the image of God in his historical development. *Humanum copia divini.* The likeness of God in man presumed in him freedom of choice and creative energy.

There were possible various methods of realization. The Christian dogma, which agrees with the general human feeling of inner disharmony, teaches that man in the choice of his ways was wrong. He inclined more to the side of his natural animalism, and lost the equilibrium between spirit and body which he needed to live a worthy life. This fall, or "original sin," left man in a state of feebleness and incapacity to realize himself in his own life and in the world. But the

Wisdom of God, the divine seeds of the creation, are indestructible in man, who *is* the image of God, is godlike. For his salvation God, whose only image was in man, became man Himself, the Prototype identified Himself with His image in man. In the words of dogma, this means that God was incarnated, connected in the person of the Logos, in one life, two natures, two wills, two energies, inconfusibly and yet inseparably. In the God-man Jesus Christ, the true humanity which was distorted by the fall, was restored or saved. In His humanity, watched over by the Holy Spirit, in the Church, the true aim of all creation was realized.

All nations and all men are called to be joined with this life, to receive the divine energy which is named in theology *grace*. Thus we must understand the incarnation of the Logos as a continuation and complete fulfilment of the creation. It is evident that man with his God-manhood cannot be more glorified that it is in Christianity. We have observed these insistent attempts to recognize man in his—I may say—divinity, man-godhood in different pagan religions of our time, especially in Marxism: *homo homini deus est*, says Feuerbach with his atheistic, anti-religious pathos (endeavor) to glorify mankind. But this assertion is disproved by a long series of further statements; namely it is asserted that this godman is an accidental bundle of atoms, an animal, a reflex of the economic structure, and so on. A true idea is confused and distorted by all these dogmas of materialism of various kinds. Man by being divine must necessarily have a spirit. The spiritual existence of a creature necessarily leads to God, because a created finite Spirit is intelligible only from the uncreated Spirit, the Creator, the very source of the spiritual life, God. This obstinate atheism, or antitheism, is a chief reason of all the further illogicalities and contradictions which become more and more insupportable.

The Christian dogma of the God-manhood, the dogmatic doctrine of the Divine Wisdom, the divine life and energy, can be applied, not only to the inner life of God Himself and His self-revelation, but also to this created world. This teaching alone can give us a sufficient and intelligible answer to the chief question of the philosophy of life, of personality and of history. The idea of God-manhood, or of the Divine Wisdom, is the guiding star of all our life and thought. If man is called really to receive divine grace in his life, he is called to accomplish the divine aims, of course, through his life in Christ by the

Holy Spirit. It is not an exaggeration for him to strive for holiness, because God is holy, and God has revealed in us this God-manhood. It is not an exaggeration to ascribe to man a leading role in history, because mankind is included in the God-manhood of God; man has his definite work and aim in the destinies of the world. Man has a call to undertake creative efforts because he is the image of God, who is the creator.

History is not a mechanical process of senseless agents, but it has a definite spiritual content, which is to be realized in this material world in its conditions. The dead areas of immense distances in the world have to be spiritualized and become vital through the efforts of mankind. Man is logos, the wisdom of the world, he is its master and artist, because he is godlike. The historical process with its struggle between the two opposite principles of Christianity and anti-Christianity, is really a way to the life after history in the future age, which though a new creative act of God, is at the same time to be prepared by the whole of human history. Even death, the last enemy, which deprives personal life of sense in an atheistic outlook, finds its deep significance in the light of the Christian belief in immortality and the resurrection. All these unanswerable questions of life find a sufficient and satisfactory answer in Christian Wisdom.

Therefore I lost nothing because of my change of mind. I understood completely what I had been seeking in paganism but was not able to find there.

At the end of these considerations I must touch briefly certain prejudices which exist in the modern world against the Christian faith. We are told that it is contrary to the scientific spirit, that religion and science cannot be reconciled, and that we must choose between science and superstition. What have I to answer to this idea of our age? First of all, I must remind you that there are possible different superstitions which belong not only to religious people but to scientific persons also, even to some serious scholars who are limited in their special research and have neither the interest nor the capacities to study problems of general significance. Their authority normally is limited to their special work, and it is a great exaggeration or even a superstition to give significance to their personal and private opinions, and to make these as infallible as the decrees of the Pope. But we observe such exaggerations and superstitions in every day life. Per-

sonally I feel able to bear witness that in my long life, which has been wholly dedicated to, not only theological, but also philosophical and scientific research, I have never felt any contradiction between true scientific and religious thoughts, which would be finally unanswerable. I know quite definitely that science in the exact sense of the word is unable to put and to decide questions of religion, though it may be enlightened and inspired itself by the light of Christ which enlightens all things.

I do not know in what degree I have solved the task of explaining my personal paradox. I have to add only a few words. The plan of my speech was purposely modeled on that of St. Paul at Athens on the Areopagus. He spoke there in a language which would be more intelligible to the Athenians; it was their language, although it was not his own. He who wished to be all things to all men, spoke in Athens in the language of philosophy, in which the same truth of Christianity was to be also expressed. I follow today this example of the great master who said about himself and his own personal life, these words: "I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord; for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ" (Phil. III, 8). "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God" (Gal. II, 20).

These words can be repeated by everyone who is Christian, but there is a mystery of personal life in Christ, a personal meeting with Christ. But those are "unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter" (II Cor. XII, 4).

SELVES AND SOULS

By Elizabeth Robinson Woods

I once heard a charming Buddhist story about a selfish monkey. All his life this monkey did just one kind act; he befriended a spider who had fallen into difficulties. When he died he was thrown into the deep pit of Hell along with a thousand other wicked monkeys. But his good deed was remembered. The grateful spider sent down a long thread into the pit, thin but strong enough to bear a monkey's weight. The monkey grasped it and began to climb. Before he was out of reach another monkey grabbed his tail, and so on, until all the monkeys in the pit were hanging on. And the thread was strong enough to bear them all. The first monkey climbed up and up, until he was within an inch of the top. Then the glad thought came into his mind, "I, the selfish monkey, have saved them." Immediately the thread broke, and all the monkeys were plunged into the pit.

For the "I," according to Buddhist teaching, is an illusion; there is no separate enduring self. What we call a self is a mere collection of material and mental elements, dissolved at death. Karma alone endures, the inexorable law that each act, each tiniest desire, must reap its full consequences here or in some future existence. It is the character, not the self, which passes from life to life as a flame passes from candle to candle; and the character is verb rather than substantive. It consists of a tendency to act in certain directions—of present desires determined by past cravings. Of those cravings we are the miserable victims. For desire is the source of all evil and pain, being essentially insatiable; its objects are as transitory as the self that longs for them. Desire causes the self to be born; at the same time it owes its own existence to the mistaken notion that the self is real. This illusion inflicts a false center on the composition and the whole life is pulled awry, becoming a tragedy of strains and stresses. Salvation lies in the realization that there is no true separateness either from the external world or from other beings past, present and future. The whole is one, and the individual has no more distinct existence than the bubble of foam which rests for an instant on the ocean wave. To the Buddhist the thought of annihilation brings peace.

There is no weeping at a Buddhist funeral,[1] nor any visible sign of sorrow. Incense smoke rises before the image of the Buddha. The candles burn without flickering in the still air. The abbot kneeling at a low altar blesses the ceremonial instruments with gestures which belong to the ancient ritual, and tells his beads. The monks, in long rows on either side, recite sutras or raise their voices in a falsetto chant, strange and even unearthly to Western ears, but solemn and moving. The form of petition is not used, but the service itself is a prayer—prayer that death may bring release from the chain of rebirths and the misery of particularity, that the spirit may lose its separateness, entering into union with the eternal Buddha in his blessed realm of Nirvana. As they meditate on this consummation, the Oriental faces grow more and more rapt, filled with a serenity as deep and impersonal as the calm on the face of the Buddha they bow before.

Nirvana is the "going out" of the craving which leads to rebirth. It is the loss of separateness, the release from selfhood and thus from pain. It is the merging of all distinctions in an absolute and obliterating One. Nirvana is partially attainable in life, but not until the body dies does the saint win full deliverance from the particular, the temporal, and the changing. To the intellect a negation, and indescribable since no categories apply, Nirvana is essentially positive in significance and profoundly desirable. Beyond the realm of consciousness and of being, it is the reality of both. From eternity to eternity it contains all that is, and yet it contains nothing. "There water, earth, fire, air are not. There no candle gives light, no sun beams, no moon shines, no darkness is. And when the enlightened has attained in stillness to insight, then is he free from form and formlessness, from pleasure and from pain."[2]

From Buddhism as a "way of life" there is much to be learned: it flowers in serenity, tolerance, generosity, and a wonderful courtesy and kindness. And the Buddhist conception of personality as a passing phenomenon has the advantage of being thoroughly realistic; its emphasis on process brings it into accord with the best of modern thought. But if we look deeper, into the substructure of the belief, we find what to most Western minds must seem a fundamental weakness—after all, Buddhism is a good deal further away from "facts" than at first appeared. For an ultimate, undifferentiated unity leaves

1. The service described belongs to the Tendai Sect in Japan.
2. *Udana* I, 10, quoted from J. B. Pratt, *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism*, page 87.

the manifold world outside; everything individual is simply a delusion, since it falls beyond the boundary of the real. Buddhism seeks refuge from the sadness of its realism in a mysticism which leaves actual everyday experience more obscure than ever, without either meaning or value. Now it may be that mysticism is essentially a retreat. But at its most sound, this is a withdrawal in the interest of clearer understanding. The insight gained is not at variance with actual experience; the actual is clarified because the mystic has learned to see in it the reality it expresses. Nor is a sound mysticism at odds with logic, save in method. Its results may go beyond those attained by the reason; they do not contradict them. But Nirvana, however real it may seem to the emotion that yearns for it, is intellectually unsatisfactory. The one without the many, like the many without the one, as Plato taught about a century later, is inconceivable and meaningless.

Plato's ultimate is that One-in-Many and Many-in-One which he called the Idea of the Good. The good is pure form or harmony, the logical basis both of knowledge and of existence, and at the same time in its fullness the goal of all that exists, and thus the ground of change and progress. To borrow Aristotle's terminology, it is both ultimate formal and ultimate final cause. In spite of hints to the contrary in some of the later dialogues, it remains for Plato more or less abstract. The actual many exist only through their participation in the ideal harmony; there is little suggestion that they have anything to add to it. Christian theology takes this next step; in the idea of the Incarnation the actual many achieve a new importance. Christ illustrates the concrete universal, the fact suffused with meaning, the Word made flesh. And Christ is a symbol of what man essentially is or may become. The Incarnation is the keynote to a new point of view, dimly adumbrated in Plato, now for the first time clearly emerging, a passionate conviction of the value of the individual. In Buddhism the self is unreal; the aim is escape from "form," annihilation of the individual. For Plato man is real in so far as he has insight into the ideal harmony; form is eternal, and the envisagement of it is immortality. The Christian believes that form is realized most fully not in abstraction, but in concrete personality itself; immortality has acquired a new meaning, for there is now something intrinsically valuable to survive.

The philosopher, seeking to appraise these beliefs, will begin with

an analysis of the concept of personality. The discussion of so fundamental a concept will be clearer if the general metaphysical background be at least sketched, however briefly and dogmatically.

Let us begin with Plato's affirmation that the real is a One-in-Many and a Many-in-One. And since labels are convenient, let us call this real "Meaning." The use of a term with so many technical implications has obvious dangers. I believe it can be justified, and I have elsewhere[3] tried to justify it: suffice it to say that meaning, both logical and aesthetic, may through analysis be defined as structure, similar to form in a work of art. And to use the word Meaning as a label for the real itself is to imply that the ultimate character of things is just such an integration. Whatever the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the term, the thought it intends to express I take to be no baseless assumption, but rather a fundamental (perhaps even an obvious) truth.

Meaning is the ground of the universe. Nothing can be known, nothing can be at all without partaking in it. As abstract it is a pregnant unity, pure possibility of form, the logical basis of existence. But the abstract by itself is non-entity: all that is real is two-poled. The world exists that the abstract may consummate itself in concreteness, and that Meaning may thereby gain full reality. The concrete, however, as finite is incomplete. In all its forms it seeks completion or self-realization. This universal impulse may be called symbolically "desire": it is the Platonic Eros. The cosmic striving for self-realization is a striving on the one hand for definiteness and precision, on the other for richness and complexity. These opposite phases are its essential aspects; the trend toward unity or individuality, and the trend toward multiplicity or universality, whether in temporary tension or in conflict or in rhythmic succession, constitute process.

The world is one, and selves are part of it; they exhibit special characteristic features, but none which are at variance with the "natural order." To do away with the traditional opposition between "mind" and "nature" is not necessarily to discredit "mind" or to glorify "nature." It is simply to deny that there are rigid boundaries. Living and non-living, conscious and unconscious, are of course genuine contrasts; they are terms descriptive of different levels, each of which has its own perfectly distinct and peculiar features. The "supernatural" is simply

3. *Music and Meaning*, Harvard University Press, 1932.

the transcendence of meaning over its own expression, and in this all natural levels partake. Selves emerge from their setting, but they do so by imperceptible degrees: there is no distinct actual dividing line between one level and the next, and through all levels flows the same fundamental general process, motivated by desire. Meaning is the basis of such existence as each level exhibits. Meaning is also the end envisaged. For no existence realizes the completeness of form for which all existence longs. All finite structures are symbolic of that perfectly harmonious structure which is always "beyond" yet always "there," never a fact and always an ideal. The curse of finitude is at the same time the necessary condition for progress, and indeed for life.

Selves are organizing activities, seeking, consciously or unconsciously, to build discerned values into a living structure. As in every finite entity, the essential impulse is the impulse toward self-realization, and there is continual conflict between the desire for clarity and order, and the desire for variety and extension. An order which is too exclusive not only lacks that element of "adventure" which is the breath of life; it is insecure, in danger of finding itself at odds with the ever-changing system of which it is a part, and to which it must adapt itself. A facile inclusiveness, on the other hand, generally veils an inner disharmony and is thus equally transitory. Growth demands both elasticity and integrity: it may be defined as the progressive discovery and incorporation of the relevant.

At the level of selfhood, consciousness reaches a higher development. All animals are aware of the objects they desire, only selves are aware also of the inner activity, the "I," which seeks to grasp and incorporate them. This activity is the most private of facts; it is what we are to ourselves. As experienced, it is subjective and immediate; it can be thought about, but only in retrospect. It is the expression of the fundamental desire for self-realization. In general, this desire itself is more or less hidden from knowledge—"subconscious," or partially conscious—and yet it is the mainspring of all our action. It emerges in the form of particular desires which are often at variance with one another, and even with the fundamental longing from which they spring. For judgment is easily confused, being characterized like all things human by finitude. What it is that drives us on we do not clearly know, nor how to satisfy it. Various objects (fame, success, the

good opinion of other people) dazzle us, atavistic impulses submerge us. All these are significant, of course, merely in their relation to our one constant desire, the longing for perfect form or completeness. But this relation we are too dull to see; and since choices create habits, in time perverse desires arise, and we become, as Buddhists believe, muddled victims of our own cravings.

Differentiated from one another subjectively by the organizing activity, we are differentiated objectively by the resultant organization. Persons are structures, and for the most part, inharmonious structures, collective rather than unified; for true individuality, which is inward unity, is comparatively rare. Liking and aversion, admiration and disapproval, are concerned primarily with the public personality, the organization, the visible work of art. But all intercourse between selves is also more than this: beneath even the most trivial conversation runs a deeper perceptiveness, some dim sense of the striving "will to meaning" behind the spoken words. And in sympathy and still more in love, through insight which is a form of identification, we are in contact direct though imperfect with that "buried stream"—the living aspiration which is the true self.

Self-consciousness depends on the ability, presumably peculiar to the human level, of perceiving structure as such; to be known at all, self must be distinguished from other-than-self, and both self and other seen as belonging to a more inclusive system. To perceive structure means to be aware of limitations; in any whole the parts are distinguished from each other and from the totality by virtue of what they are not, as well as by virtue of what they are. All perceptible things are perceptible only as tinged with negation. What they might have been and have failed to be, what they may become but are not yet, what they could never be, are all part of their essential nature as objects of knowledge. Herein lies the germ both of tragedy and of humor, those so closely allied and so typical aspects of human life. Herein also lies the germ of moral responsibility—of conscience, of sin, and of freedom.

Conscience is the measuring of the observed partial self against the whole self envisaged by desire, the sense of shortcoming and perhaps of tragedy in the moral sphere. And all sin is sin "against the Holy Ghost," the deliberate suppression or perversion of the natural longing for wholeness—a violence against the deepest self which is the

inner light. In judging that it has sinned, the self is to some extent free from its sin, since it transcends itself as sinning. And the mind, perceiving the alternate possibilities implicit in the actual, is not bound by that actual. But there is a paradox in the situation, for to choose wrong is not to be free. Only in conforming to the purpose of the process, only in choosing structure or meaning (which involves limitation as well as expansion), can freedom be attained. For freedom is harmony.

Mind transcends its particular situation through memory, purpose, imagination, and through the symbolism and abstraction involved in thinking; each of those is concerned with what is not present to the senses. The great, typically human adventures—art, science and philosophy, moral and religious activity—are all forms of transcendence. In them all we seek escape from the narrowness and transiency of our lives through the discovery or creation of permanent relationships. In them all meaning is discerned and pursued as an end for its own sake valuable. For science and philosophy search for classifications, laws, and principles; and the essential aim is understanding rather than control. Only in its decadence is art a mere imitation of nature; all great art is the concrete expression of the enduring patterns which lie beneath the changing aspects of experience. Goodness is insight into the connectedness of things, manifested in human relations—joy accompanies it, and its true name is love. Religion is the fundamental activity, present to some extent, consciously or unconsciously, in all life's adventures. It is the search for wholeness and renewed life through communication with intrinsic value. It rests on the intuition of a friendly universe, and it discovers beneath life's tragedy a harmony which is the source of peace and of life.

All these are ends which exceed any mere personal satisfaction; in them all the self relinquishes its emphasis on the verb "to have," and the "grasping" desire which the Buddhist scorns is overcome. And yet in pursuit of them alone does the fundamental subconscious Eros find release and reconciliation. In them we escape from confusions, we rid ourselves of incoherence and distortion, becoming simpler and more unified because we have found our true center; and, in contact with that structure which is intrinsically valuable, we win individuality. Self has been transcended, as for the Buddhist, but the escape has led not into a rich emptiness, but into a world of meaning in which we

have a place. In the realization of the self that to be found it must be lost it is born a soul.

Souls may be defined as organizing activities, engaged in the conscious search for meaning. A soul is not something one has, but something one is or may become—something to be achieved. It indicates a new level, emerging from the level of self-hood. As in all levels, the boundaries are not distinct. Soul may be present in an infinite number of varying degrees, and whether or not it pervades the human sphere no mere human could know. And souls, like selves, are incomplete—hope still exceeds accomplishment; but unlike selves, souls know the way that leads toward wholeness.

While the life of the soul in its fullness is for mortals a regulative idea rather than an accomplished fact, certain men and women clearly manifest aspects of that life in the form of qualities which seem to pertain to a good deeper than changing moral codes, and to have about them a flavor of absoluteness and finality. Some of these qualities may be briefly indicated.

The life of the soul is a life of utter integrity, since unity is its standard and its principle. It is at the same time a life of adventure, only souls being fully alive. But this is not a mere excited diffusion of energy in the search for variety, nor is the unity a rigid narrowness which preserves itself by suspicious exclusion. Souls possess a dynamic single-mindedness which is both inward and vivid. They grow, and acquire wisdom and discipline; and accumulated experience neither confuses nor stales them. For them strangeness is neither a menace, nor a source of idle excitement, but a challenge; they seek instinctively to bring the new experience into the ever-widening circle of things understood and enjoyed. Thus souls share actively in the shaping of an ordered universe.

Since it is aware of the striving purpose in other people, in nature animate and inanimate, in itself, the soul is incapable either of harshness or of self-righteousness. And discerning the oneness which is beneath and beyond all striving, it seeks to make this still more concrete and explicit in human relationships. But the real is many as well as one, and manyness is finitude, and finitude involves frustration, separation, loss, death. Being human, souls must suffer. This suffering is transcended, not in a tame submission to remediable ills, nor in a blind or sentimental denial of facts, but in a realization that pain is

inseparable from life, being part of its essence, and at the same time incidental to the purpose of which that life is the expression. Souls obey the injunction "take up thy cross"; they embrace without bitterness the consequences of living at the same time both in and beyond this world. And in this acceptance there is release. On the other side at last there is peace and freedom—peace in the enjoyment of eternal values, freedom from the tyranny of self and its conflicts, found only in submission to all the limitations and restrictions imposed by structural necessity.

All these qualities—integrity, adventure, love, peace, freedom—are in essence religious qualities. The religion here spoken of has already been defined; it will be obvious that it is not identical with, though it may include, the more specialized official religion which bases itself on creeds and formulated beliefs. It includes the secular as well, but a secular which has attained form, and purged itself of triviality. To be sure, the mysticism which is the heart of all religion is essentially a withdrawal from secular activities; the soul needs to detach itself from its customary pursuits that it may go back to them refreshed. For manyness and transiency make sense only if one learns to see in them the enduring unity that underlies and sustains them; from life as a muddle of particulars mysticism rescues us. But the multiplicity and the unity are not opposed; they imply one another, being complementary extremes—two poles of the same reality. God needs the world, even as the world needs God. Religion promises renewal of life, but life is the expansion of connectedness. Thus, when the religious experience is complete, the connections are illuminated. The soul is not estranged from science, philosophy, art, and human relations by having been in contact with that which is the essence of them all; and fear of truth, distrust of beauty, failure to love, are all forms of atheism rather than genuine evidences of religious insight.

These ends pursued by souls are real and lasting, the pursuits themselves are never completely successful, and point beyond their own achievements. Science and philosophy seek not only to be logical, but also to be true, and thus they entail unending progression. Beauty is forever imperfect, a symbol touched with the sadness of finitude. Selfishness is never fully vanquished, nor can those who love overcome their inevitable dividedness. In religion man never attains that entire conformity of the human will with the cosmic purpose which is free-

dom. But in a world where form is ultimate such incompleteness seems to lack finality. This leads to the hope that souls may be immortal, and that human love which transcends death need not itself be transcended.

The intuition persists that value is forever real; that all who have ever truly lived, consummating abstract form in concrete individuality, live still; that those who in this world pursue Meaning as an end in itself are not alone. Isolation is conquered, not in the "obliterating unity" of a Nirvana, but in a "communion of saints"; a sense of the interpenetration of all lives, of all being, which can be expressed symbolically in the phrase, "God is love." For though diversity is as real as unity, there is no separateness; all are members of one body, one timeless and invisible integration.

A CRITIQUE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM

By Sterling P. Lamprecht
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When we examine carefully the course of religious liberalism in our western world, we become quickly aware that we have to deal with an inchoate movement the outlines of which are confused and uncertain. We can easily determine the *terminus a quo* of the movement, because it has been a protest against the authority of established creeds and appointed officials and forms. But we can with difficulty perceive any *terminus ad quem,* because religious liberals are individualistic in their beliefs and divergent in their practices. The degree of unity which an historian may find in religious liberalism is chiefly furnished by the negative emphasis in the movement, by the fact that the movement has been a protest or a rebellion. The observer of the contemporary situation in religious liberalism hears only a welter of voices pitched in different keys. Liberals in religion, as in politics or economics, do not constitute a cohesive body, clear in their doctrinal positions, possessed of compatible aspirations, working with kindred feelings towards a common goal. Neither at any moment in the history of the last two or three hundred years nor at the present moment can we describe the course of religious liberalism by any simple formula, or fix its intended goal by any clear definition.

In the midst of the *mêlée* of voices of religious liberals it is hazardous to make any generalization. Yet generalization is always tempting. And this discussion aims, even at the expense of overstatement, to point out one generalization which history may justify, and then to criticise the outcome towards which religious liberals, at least a great many religious liberals, are seemingly headed.

The generalization is this: that religious liberals, sensitive to advances in physics and literary criticism and other branches of knowledge, have more and more abandoned the right to pronounce concerning any particular matters of fact, and have turned instead to an insistence upon the primacy of certain values. And the outcome of liberalism, if this generalization be sound and apply to the future, as it seems to apply to the past course of liberalism, would be that fact and value would be severed from each other, that fact be left to the

determination of empirical investigation by scientists, and that religion should be concerned with an independent field of values.

This generalization does seem to be a valid interpretation of the history of religious liberalism. The orthodox creeds certainly asserted many doctrines about matters of fact, historical and cosmological. These creeds were seldom rejected in their entirety by religious liberals. But bit by bit, and point by point, the doctrines about matters of fact have been undermined by the advances in knowledge about history and the nature of the world. It has been popular to allege, under the influence of Andrew D. White's great book and other such studies, that there has been a long warfare between science and theology. There has hardly been, however, a warfare between scientists and theologians. The Church of Rome may have forced Galileo to recant, and other ecclesiastical restraints on scientific and literary workers may be listed. Yet it has not been true in the past, nor is it true today, that scientists are arrayed on one side and religious men on the other. Even when dispute waxed hot over special points, e.g., uniformity of nature *versus* special providence or miracle, continuity of biological development *versus* special creation of species, scriptural inerrancy *versus* literary analysis of the Pentateuch or the Gospels, even then the alignment of forces was not so simple as it has sometimes been depicted. The warfare has really been between men who were ready to follow new investigations with open minds and men who were tenaciously holding to established creeds and dogmatic formulations. When one remembers the conflict between the Cartesians and Aristotelians of the seventeenth century, or the leadership which Biblical scholars have shown in the field of literary criticism, it becomes doubtful whether one could conclude that there has on the whole been more open-mindedness among scientific workers and more doctrinal insistence among theologians.

One distinguishing mark which characterizes the leaders of liberal religion from liberals in other fields can be pointed out. The leaders of liberal religion were seldom themselves the men who investigated the matters of fact about which controversies have raged. An exception to this statement is, of course, the investigation of the literary problems of the Old and New Testaments, possibly also, but to a lesser extent, the investigation of church history. Generally speaking, however, religious liberals have studied matters of fact at second hand, or through

the work and books of the actual investigators. And this fact is important. For it has made of religious liberalism, not so much an attitude of loyalty to evidence and humility before facts, as an attitude of non-commitment on all factual considerations altogether. Religious liberals, it might be said, have left the determination of matters of fact to the scientific and historical and literary workers, and have themselves been primarily concerned to show that the values they cherish are not threatened by the successive advances in knowledge. While a scientific worker has had to contend directly for the truth of his new conclusion, the religious liberal, following the scientific investigation with open mind, has had to contend that after all his religious position was still, in its essentials, intact and valid.

The age of the earth, the structure of the solar system, the date of appearance of life on the earth, and the genetic connection of species, the descent of man, the authorship of the Pentateuch, the historicity of New Testament narratives, these and many other problems of matters of fact, however much they may interest a certain religious liberal, have come gradually to be regarded by religious liberals generally as not essentially of importance to the cause of religion. Religious liberals have shown a healthy reluctance not to be driven about by every fresh intellectual breeze; they have not hurried to embrace every new suggestion as soon as it has been broached. But they have, slowly and surely, given up the attempt to pronounce on such matters, and to accept the findings of literary and historical and scientific workers as more probable than the ancestral creeds which asserted contrary doctrines about matters of fact. The tendency of religious liberalism through the last two or three hundred years seems clearly to be to leave the determination of all matters of fact to secular workers. This tendency is far from having reached its obvious goal; for it has carried many thoughtful religious leaders only part way along its course. Yet, while incomplete, the tendency has clearly a definite direction. More and more religious liberals are coming to suppose that valid religion is not dependent upon *any* conclusion in *any* matters of fact, that the more essential cause and function of religion are but endangered when they are temporarily regarded as so dependent.

If the tendency continues and reaches its indicated goal, the position will come to be explicitly recognized that religion is concerned with achieving a unique quality in men's lives, whatever may be deter-

mined to be the probable truth about the constitution and history of the world in which those lives must be led. Religious liberals, in spite of manifold differences among themselves, seem to combine a kind of "reverent agnosticism" about all matters of fact with a firm conviction in the intrinsic worth of the religious way of life. They may not even agree in detail as to exactly what the religious way of life involves; they may, indeed they often do, lingeringly emphasize some few doctrines about the matters of fact the affirmation of which they believe to be still tenable. But their mission, their gospel, is to hold aloft the finality of certain values which seem to them precious and absolute. If religious liberals turned from the ancestral assertions about matters of fact upon which scientific advances have thrown doubt to new conclusions about matters of fact to which scientific advances have given a degree of probability, they would be involved in constant controversy and in an agitation that is not of direct and immediate religious concern. They have therefore found it congenial to abandon all fact-finding to secular investigators, and then to insist, in the face of whatever the truth about matters of fact may be, that human lives may and should seek to realize, to manifest, to pursue certain values that remain unimperiled and supreme. And the more completely religious liberals have divorced their religious position from the processes of fact-finding, the more apparent and the more intense has become their determination to cherish their religious values with undying loyalty.

Such is the generalization which both the past history and the present situation of religious liberalism seem to warrant one in asserting. Religion, according to the utterance of many liberals, is concerned with value-judgments, not with factual judgments. Of religious liberals one might properly say what Santayana well says of one of them, Royce: "There could indeed be no conflict in his mind between faith and science, because his faith began by accepting all facts and all scientific probabilities in order to face them religiously."[1] To face all facts and all scientific probabilities religiously has seemed to mean, for thoroughgoing religious liberals, that religion deals primarily with values and has no essential concern with matters of fact at all.

The outcome of the trend of liberalism about which a generalization has been offered is one of grave danger, possibly in the end to the cause

1. *Character and Opinion in the United States*, p. 126.

of religion itself, more immediately to the interests of sound morals. Religion has ever been intense, both when it has occurred as a genuine personal experience and when it has been transmitted as a persistent social tradition. It has always involved a high-flung devotion to an unquestioned good, a loyalty to an absolute. St. Paul said: "Whether therefore yet eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God."[2] The religious attitude is hardly possible without some such abandonment to a final good. "Seek ye *first* the Kingdom of God."[3]

It was this element of almost reckless abandon in religion that brought the churches into conflict from time to time with political powers or scientific workers or social forces, just as it was the same element that gave to the churches their martyrs and missionaries, and that provided religion with its survival value in times of stress. But as the result of the trend of which I have generalized, the center of religious insistence has shifted, and consequently the point of possible conflict is shifting too. Religious liberals, in so far as they are willing to let disinterested research determine matters of fact in the physical world and the records of history, can hardly carry on warfare with the physical and historical sciences. But in making religion a matter of devotion to values conceived as ultimate and absolute, religion runs the risk of coming into conflict with morals. Religious leaders, it is true, hold conventions and debate programs, in the effort to decide upon ways and means to guide their forces and to achieve their ends. But too often their ends are fixed and *a priori*. Not infrequently one hears it said today that the account of creation in Genesis is poetry but the meaning of the narrative is of indestructible import, or that the miracles of the New Testament are legends but the ethical teachings of the Gospels are binding for all time.

Separation of fact and value has been theoretically promoted by the Kantian tradition in philosophy. Kantianism has been the moulding force in German speculative thought during the last century, and the dominant influence in liberal religion for several generations has come from the German universities. Until 1914 at least, it was usually to Germany that students went for advanced study in theology, unless these students were attached to some established orthodoxy, Catholic or Protestant. Thus the point of view of Kantian philosophy has pre-

2. I Corinthians X, 31.
3. Matthew VI, 33.

vailed in the circles where religious liberalism was forming. Kantianism involves the position that matters of fact in the empirical world are without exception determined according to the forms and principles of which the sciences are the full exposition. But Kantianism, having given the sciences unlimited right to analyse experience, has subsequently maintained that morals and religion rest upon the authority of an independent and categorical imperative. This imperative is thoroughly abstract and *a priori*. It depends on no analysis of matters of fact; rather it gains its vitality from its alleged right to legislate for men without reference to what the facts may in any situation be. In Kant himself the more concrete material which filled in the bare outlines of the categorical imperative came from the Protestant pietism in which he had himself been reared. In later generations that concrete material has come from loyalty to the state, from party aspirations, or from some other subtle influence which happened to control the imagination or kindle the affections of the men who asserted the categorical imperative with idealistic devotion. Thus Kant, apart from his own highminded intent, has been a factor whose influence has been spent in reviving as moral absolutes the partisan and prejudiced moral programs of dogmatic groups.

Historically the Kantian influence coincided with the obvious need of liberals for a theoretical basis to which to turn, in order that their emancipation from old formulae should not leave them without intellectual foundations for their cherished values. Just when liberals were left with ideals that had no factual support, Kantianism came to their rescue and enabled them to justify their anomalous positions on seemingly forceful grounds. The philosophical influence of Kant is probably on the wane, among theologians as well as among philosophers generally. But its former popularity was so great that it has left a legacy behind it, with the result that men often suppose that they are entitled to assert the final worth and binding sanction of moral principles independently of any factual considerations. Religious liberals have assuredly been more sane and healthy in practice than sound in theory, partly because of the historical accident that the New Testament has remained a respected book of devotion for even those who deny its divine origin and its inerrancy, partly because of the gracious temper of the liberals themselves. None the less, much liberalism in religion is implicitly unregulated and autocratic in its proclamation

of ideals and values. And as such, liberalism in religion contains a menace which might at any time be revealed in the pressing issues of affairs. To borrow the language of Matthew Arnold, religious liberals have more sweetness than light; they stand more in the Hebraic than the Hellenic tradition. Their number includes many competent leaders who might furnish the intellectual guidance which would transform what Arnold calls anarchy into what he designates culture. But the guidance is not being exerted with power. It is hardly too much to say that in the contemporary situation religious liberals as a whole are highminded in purpose and uninformed in mind.

The pursuit of good in human affairs deserves the same candid and experimental inquiry that is given to physical and historical problems. We should not lose sight of the old meaning of *moral* as problematic and tentative. We speak at times of moral probability and of being morally certain. Moral probability is sufficient to guide practice in the absence of assurance of proof; we are morally certain when we have grounds on which to act, but still do not really know. This fundamental characteristic of the moral element in life is too often overlooked. Our moral problems are just those we must work out gradually under the discipline of experience: they are just those for which we have no settled antecedent answer. If a problem has an antecedent answer which has merely to be executed by rule, it is technological and not moral. Now of course we know, and we are justified in claiming that we know, many things about problems of moral conduct as we also know many things about the physical world and the course of history. We have accumulated sufficient experience to know that certain values tied up with our basic institutions of home and school and nation are precious and worthy of strong devotion. But our knowledge of moral concerns is not sufficient to enable us to form fixed standards or to lay down established programs for the complex affairs of our contemporary world. We have in the Christian tradition a heritage of many elements, such as the ideals of Plato, temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice, and the ideals of Jesus, purity and peace-making, humility and love. But any definition of such terms, however clear, is necessarily abstract. What concretely those terms mean today or tomorrow, no one fully knows. We have no experience of all the human goods that may be potential in the present juncture of our troubled affairs. If we may use the picturesque

language of conventional religious imagery, we might say that we have not penetrated very far into the structure of the Kingdom of Heaven. Our ideals may be tools of effective criticism; but they are not contractor's blue-prints which require only industry to be realized.

Religious liberals today may not, as a group, be ardent propagandists for prohibition as a certain remedy for the liquor problem. But frequently they seem to be enthusiastic supporters of the so-called Oxford resolution for pacifism, and of any and every proposal to favor labor interests against capitalism. Their enthusiasms are, and deserve to be, contagious. But enthusiasm of every kind, like that particular enthusiasm we call patriotism, is not enough. We need criticism too. We need cautious attention to matters of fact. We need adjustment of abstract principle to the exigencies of practice.

Religious liberalism would become a menace if it tended to make men think that their lofty ideals were an adequate solution to this old world's ills. Yet the trend in historic liberalism concerning which this paper offered a generalization has tended to promote just such thinking. The distinction between fact and value has not been thought through with clarity and thoroughness. It has always proved disastrous to abandon fact-finding to experimental inquiry, and then to hold zealously to values supposed to be independent of such fact-finding. It would be indeed ironic if the humility which liberals have showed before evidence upon matters of fact were accompanied by intransigence in morals. The separation of fact and value can not be defended by a sound philosophy. Ideals are not impervious to criticism nor absolute in their authority over men's wills. An enthusiasm that divorces values from fact, and then crystallizes them into final pronouncements on life's moral significance, is dangerous. Sound morals must grow out of a progressive realization of the potentialities of variable human situations; they can not be *a priori* forms imposed upon men without regard to these situations. The course of religious liberalism will be disastrous if it does not remedy its latent moral autocracy. Liberals should not regard any of their religious aspirations, however suggestive and vitalizing, or any of their religious values, however genuine and lofty, as giving them a final perspective into the moral possibilities of human life.

Naskapi: The Savage Hunters of the Labrador Peninsula. By FRANK G. SPECK. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935. 284 pp. $3.50.

At last Professor Speck has given us this long awaited book on the religious ideas and practices of the Naskapi—the result of approximately twenty-five years of intensive field-work with these hunters. And the reader will not be disappointed, for a wealth of new data is presented. Probably it is safe to say that previously only scattered information of a rather meager character was available. The non-specialist will note the absence of elaborate ceremonies, and that religious ideas and practices bulk heavily around game-animals. The suggestion that plausibly the Central Algonkian Midewin has an undeveloped forerunner (p. 202) among these nomads is probably well-founded.

Since this book is such a splendid ethnological production it seems almost a pity to point out that linguistically it is decidedly below par. In view of Speck's known remarkable facility for acquiring a practical knowledge of American Indian languages, it is safe to say that this deficiency is due to too great reliance on native informants and interpreters without subjecting their statements to a rigid grammatical analysis, and to his apparent lack of interest in comparative Algonkian linguistics which have been developed tremendously in recent years, especially by the labors of Bloomfield. Under these circumstances, even at the risk of being labelled a chronic fault-finder, I shall try to substantiate the above, and point out that at times an ethnological bearing is at stake. So on p. 37 *Kantce · 'təpelta'k* is translated by "Our Great Master or Owner"; this translation is impossible, for the third person animate singular is the subject, and the third person inanimate is the object as shown by medial *-lt-* to say nothing of the termination. On p. 42 the translation "I wish to content, or satisfy myself"; literally, "I wish to make my friend [soul] feel good" is given. Analysis of the Indian text shows that the first rendition is literal, not the second, for *nəwi · məlowe'ltaman* shows by *-lt-* as well as termination that the grammatical object is inanimate. We read on p. 118 *təpənəmək nəme'c* "he who governs fish." Such a translation is impossible, for the first word demands the first person singular as sub-

ject and the third person animate as object, and the second word is not an obviative in form as it should be if the third person animate had been the subject. Observe on p. 119 there is the sentence *Məsəna'kω* "I am called, the one who is master of the fish." Obviously "I who am master of the fish" is implied. Clearly then this corresponds to what I have suggested. Similarly on p. 127 "he sees his soul" is an error, for analysis of the Indian shows that the third person animate singular can not be the subject. Nor can *elte'ltamən* "he thinks" (p. 184; dialect of Lake St. John) be correctly rendered, for it is in violation of what more than a dozen and a half Algonkian languages tell us. I may add that *məntu' elte'ltak'* "spirit-power thinking" on the same page implies that the subject is the third person animate singular and the third person inanimate the object; and I may note that *manitōw* in Bloomfield's Plains Cree Texts, even when meaning "mystic power" is grammatically animate. And it seems hard to believe that *nemictu'wəts* "thunder" (pp. 62-239) is singular, in spite of Lemoine's apparent support (which is not noticed by Speck), for the termination clearly looks like an animate plural [per contra Rupert's House *ni'mstcu'* "thunder"]; and the analogy of Cree, Fox, Menomini, etc., linguistically would seem to compel this. (See, too, Speck, p. 70.) The translation of *matə ste'haman* (p. 81) "he sacrifices to an animal" is incorrect, for the third person animate can not be the grammatical subject.

Scattered throughout the book are various etymologies most of which, I regret to say, cannot be substantiated scientifically. If they are "popular" etymologies given by Indians, they are most interesting, but of this no intimation is given. Thus on p. 50 we are told that *atcakwu'c* means "little soul" and "star" and that the plural used for both these meanings is the animate plural of *atca'kω* "soul" which lacks the diminutive suffix. Now, even if the words under discussion are properly recorded with the assigned meanings, the published dictionaries and texts of various Algonkian languages and Bloomfield's remarkable paper on Algonkian phonology would show that two historically distinct words have been fused. But another possibility is present, namely, are the words properly recorded? Now it would be noticed that in this volume Speck either consistently or nearly so, does not record a Greek *spiritus asper* (h in Bloomfield's transcription) before consonants in Montagnais-Naskapi dialects where historically

it is to be expected. Now I can not categorically deny that there are some Cree and Montagnais-Naskapi dialects in which hk and k, ht and t, hp and p, htc and tc fall together into k, t, p and tc respectively. But my experience with the Cree of Files Hills, Fort Totten (Turtle Mountain), Moose Factory, Albany, Attawapiskat, and Weenusk as well as the Montagnais-Naskapi dialects of Lake St. John, Mistassini, Rupert's House, East Main, Fort George, Great Whale River, Davis Inlet, and the Northwest River, as well as notes of another on Nichigun, make me very dubious of it, and a Temiscaming text published by Speck over twenty years ago shows inconsistency in this very respect. I have recorded Moose *ahtcāhk* "soul", *tcahk*, *atca'hkus* "star"; Albany *a'tcā'hk* "soul", *watca'hkuc* "star"; Attawapiskat *hahtcā'hk* "soul", *watca'hkuc* "star" (*watcā'hkuc* once); Weenusk *hatcā'hk* "soul" from a young informant without characteristic phonetics), *watcā'hkuc* "star"; Fort George *atcahk^{u}s* "star" (the word for "soul" is wholly distinct); from a Rupert's House Indian at Moose Factory I have recorded *atca'hk^{uc}* "star" which clearly is in Rupert's House dialect, but *ahtcāhk* "soul" and *ndahtcāhk* "my soul" are apparently in the Moose dialect. Watkins gives Cree *'acha'k* "soul" and *uchu'koos*, *uchu'k* "star" (for typographical reasons I have placed the ' before k, not over the a and u); Lacombe gives Cree *atchâk* "soul" and *atchâkus* (*atchakus*) for "little star, star", also *atakus* "star" as well as *atâk* (*atak*) "star" (ignoring capitals and italics in all cases). Years ago Bloomfield recorded Cree *atāhk* "star." This combined with Fox *anāga* "star," Ojibwa *anāñg* "star," Delaware *allanque* (Brinton) "star" prove that the Proto-Algonkian archetype for "star" is **aθānkwa* (in Bloomfield's transcription; he pointed out the archetype in the above mentioned paper). The *tc* of the Cree word for "star," and for "little star" is unoriginal; it is a living consonantic change from *t* in diminutives; and this is irrespective of whether the *t* is original or whether derived from **θ*; the evidence of other related languages shows that it started from original *t* and then spread. In this connection it may be well to give the Abnaki words cited Laurent: *mjejakws* "soul," *alakws* "star." I may point out where *wa-* occurs dialetically for *a-* in Cree, it is secondary; there are parallels for this. If Speck means to imply Penobscot *keta'nk^{w}zu* "ghost" (p. 50) is related to the words under discussion (I am not at all sure he does), nevertheless this is phonetically impossible; but if he

wishes to imply "ghost trail" is an old concept I fully agree. I do not see the pertinence of Penobscot *awa'tawe'su* "star" in this connection. For the reasons given partially above it is impossible to connect *Wiskedja'n* and *Wisa'kadjak* (a transformer's name) [*Wīsahkätcähk* in Bloomfield's transcription; *Wīsahkētcähk* in mine; *Wīsahkwētcähk* at Moose] and to hold *wi·skədjaja'k'ω* (a designation of *Wi'ckədjaku'c*, the Canada jay[1]) as meaning "Wiskedjan's soul", apparently identifying *Wiskedja'k* with *Wisa'kadjak*. (See pp. 55, 125.) Popularly no doubt these associations easily could occur; but scientifically they are untenable. [Nor has *Wiskədján'* any connection with *Wisa'kadjak*.] Similarly the etymologies of *ni·bo'wo* "death" (p. 78) and *ni·maba'n* "pack-strap" (p. 203) are scientifically unsound, though they may be "popular." In justice to Speck, it must be said that he did not consider the etymology of the second word as "a positive one." Another etymology which is unsound is that on p. 192: 'Among the Mistassini beads are called *mi·'tcəts*, a term having apparently some relation to the verb "to eat" (*mi·'t'cu*).' From the ethnological situation I have no doubt that popularly there is an association, but it is easily demonstrated that the resemblance of the words are entirely fortuitous and due to a phonetic shift of Montagnais-Naskapi dialects as is shown by the collective evidence of Sauk, Fox, Kickapoo, Menomini, Algonkin, Ojibwa, and Cree (Cree *mīkis "bead"*; pl. *mīkisak;* also *mīkisis; mītci-* "eat"; similarly in other languages; the Cree words are cited in Bloomfield's transcription). [The shift of *k* to *tc* before an *i*-vowel (even if historically lost) in Montagnais-Naskapi dialects has been known for years.]

Speck (p. 54) very properly points out that *Tcəka'bec*, the name of a legendary hero, can not be etymologized with certainty; and gives two etymologies which are in vogue. The second one ("small man") is certainly an ancient one, for in the *Jesuit Relations*, ed. Thwaites, vol. 12, pp. 32, 33, for 1637, the same hero is a "little Dwarf." Variants occur in Ojibwa and Cree, and if correctly recorded do not quite harmonize with one another; the meaning assigned favors "little man," and this accords with the meaning assigned by the Indians of the Great Whale River; there are, however, phonetic difficulties.

1. Is this term an Indianization of English Whisky Jack? On this last see the Oxford Dictionary.

In the discussion of the Master of the Fish, it is noted that in some dialects the term for moose-fly and terrapin coincide; and it is suggested a transfer of meaning has taken place, the term for terrapin being the original. This last is certainly true as shown by collective Algonquian linguistics. Speck on p. 118 says that the terrapin as master of the fish does not seem to have been reported among other tribes to the south or west of the Naskapi, yet it would seem that in the very next paragraph he reports this very thing for the Mistassini (but in some publications he includes them under this term). By the way, the exact counterpart of the name occurs among the Indians of the Great Whale River, but they apparently do not identify the being with anything.

When it is stated on p. 55 that the great mythical personage of the Cree, etc., under the proper name of Wisa'kadjak and variants appears as an insignificant character among the Labrador tribes, that apparently is so; but it is worthy of note that though the name disappears, a number of the exploits attributed to him in other areas are attached to heroes with different names at Fort George and Fort Chimo. When Speck adds that the earth-diver theme does not cross to the eastward of the same culture boundary, that is, the St. Maurice River (a footnote states that the Mistassini may be an exception to this limitation), he is in error: I have found it at Rupert's House and Fort George.

So much of the general ethnology given agrees so well with that of the Algonkian tribes in the vicinity of James and Hudson's bay, that it is well to say that *Mista'peo* "Great Man" as a synonym for "soul" (p. 41) has no counterpart in these areas. Miss Flannery has also pointed this out in her review of Speck's book in the *American Anthropologist*, N.S., 38, pp. 491, 492.

According to Professor Speck the Montagnais-Naskapi are nominal Roman Catholics; but this a very superficial veneer. Tce'· məntu "Great [Real] Spirit" in its present form is due to European influence, but apparently there is a native substratum as certain designations have cognates elsewhere, e.g., among the Penobscots. Mətci'·· məntu'‘ "Bad Power" is of European origin. But the concept has been associated with the native Atce'n, a cannibal demon. There is no formal religion, no priesthood, and no theological creed. The individual is paramount. The concept of məntu' "power" is fundamental.

Each successful male hunter is a conjuror "In accordance with the idea that hunting is a holy occupation and that game animals are holy as well." A synonym of soul (mistapeo "Great Man") is more descriptive of the soul's function than that of soul. Divination (especially scapulamancy) is really a keynote. There are over-lords of game animals and fishes. There is a bear cult; and the Bear Feast is worthy of mention. A ceremonial term for bear is "Short tail." The reviewer will point out that similar ceremonial terms exist elsewhere, e.g., Sauk, Fox (see Bull. 95 BAE., p. 2), and Tuskarora (see Bull. 30 BAE., Pt. II, 850). The transformer (culture-hero) is Tsəka'bec.

If I have spent much space in pointing out certain deficiencies it is not that I am unmindful of the real merits of Speck's book which for a long time to come must remain a great source book of information on the religious beliefs and practices of nomadic Algonkians written by a sympathetic observer, but it is in the hope that these annotations will make it even more useful.*

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Die Legenden von Nā-Ro-Pa. By ALBERT GRÜNWEDEL. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1933. 250 pp.

In his last publication the late Tibetologist, Albert Grünwedel, submits *"The Legends of Nā-Ro-Pa,* the chief representative of necromancy and witchcraft, as evidence of the influence of the Manichaean mysteries on northern Buddhism." It is based on an ancient Tibetan manuscript. The value of this work has been underestimated by the translator and its author. Although it has as yet attracted little attention except among Orientalists, it has a twofold significance for a larger public—a public interested in mythological and psychological research.

It is significant as a veritable mine of most valuable mythological and religio-historical materials, waiting for the penetrating labors of the interpreter. These materials give the greater promise since they are presented in their very crude, almost chaotic primitive state. As yet there has been no attempt at an interpretation of the text, despite the fact that our present-day psychological methods make it possible

* Printed by Courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution.

to comprehend difficult and complex myths and dreams, as is shown, e.g., in Heinrich Zimmer's *Maya, der indische Mythos*, and in Philipp Metman's *Mythos und Schicksal*.

Merely as a stimulus to a study of the exceptionally rich content of the legends, we attempt here briefly a birds-eye view of it: In the beginning of the story Nā-Ro-Pa, who is said to have lived from 924 to 1039, and who plays an important part in the history of Buddhistic Lamaism in Tibet, is represented, in keeping with the various biographies of the Buddha, as having been conceived and born in a royal palace under auspicious signs and in an unusual and wonderful manner.

After Nā-Ro-Pa (i.e., "The Mother's Best") had been educated in the arts of knighthood and had been married, there came for him, as for the Buddha himself, the moment in which he renounced all worldly life and left home to become a monk. After long wanderings he became abbot of a monastery.

There he has a vision. An old woman with the thirty-seven marks of ugliness—his mother in her awful aspect—appears to him in grotesquely distorted form as a shadow on the book he is reading, and asks him whether he understands, not only the words, but also the meaning of the doctrines he is studying. At that he becomes conscious of his lack, leaves the monastery, and starts out in search of the myterious Ti-Lo-Pa, who as his teacher appears to him at long intervals in symbols which are for his instruction, but which he always comprehends too late.

He is subjected to severe tests. The appearance of his teacher in the form of a loathsome leprous woman along the way is to teach him that in the presence of the great prototype of being all distinctions vanish. A dog half consumed by vermin is to awaken in him boundless compassion with all beings. A man who is crushing skulls symbolizes that egotism is to be crushed. In the form of a huntsman who desires his companionship his teacher instructs him to make chase on his wildly roaming personal propensities. As a woman offering him forbidden food he would free him from petty scruples. Lastly he is required to mortify the paternal and maternal principle. Liberation from the burdens imposed by this principle is the decisive prerequisite for correctly understanding his teacher, who on the day thereafter appears to him for the first time in his human form.

But now Nā-Ro-Pa's despondency reaches its crisis. In a dream he sees blind people who yet can see, deaf people without ears who yet can hear, lame people who run, and corpses being resurrected. Not able to understand these symbols, he contemplates suicide in order that he might perchance in a subsequent incarnation find the teacher. With the words, "I have sought and not found, O humiliating vanity," he seizes a knife and is about to sever his jugular vein when deliverance comes, and a voice from heaven proclaims that he has found the teacher.

Ti-Lo-Pa now instructs him. But he must undergo much torture. His teacher demands of him reverent and unconditional self-sacrifice even unto death. Leaping from the roof of the temple, leaping into fire, bathing in a leech-infested swamp, torturing himself by imbedding small oil-lamps in his flesh—one is at a loss to know whether these all are symbolical gestures or real deaths suffered by Nā-Ro-Pa, in order that he might in numerous rebirths continue to strive for the one goal, the correct doctrine.

His instruction was in the form that is everywhere typical of late-buddhistic pedagogy—the form of symbolical intimations of truth, the meaning and formulation of which the student himself must find. E.g., when Ti-Lo-Pa ties a live snake into a knot which then opens again of itself, it signifies necessary self-redemption out of the cycle of births.

Then his teacher demands that he take a *mudra,* which means here that through clearly conscious commerce with a woman, who for him is a symbol-complex, he attain to higher knowledge. Subsequently, however, self-punishment is exacted for the pleasure enjoyed. In all this the cruelty of the teacher knows no limit. In lieu of other material Nā-Ro-Pa must erect a *mandala,* a soul-diagram, with the hacked members of his own body. He must eat putrid food from skulls. But through these purifications, cruel as they are, his teacher imparts to him the loftiest knowledge of the Buddhist religion.

A king is so deeply impressed by Nā-Ro-Pa's killing an elephant with a magic look, that he gives him his daughter as *mudra.* Nā-Ro-Pa now is the hero, she is his *shakti,* his inner motive power and director. Together with her he undertakes a chase to bring beings to the fulfilment of their inner destiny. That is to say, he kills them and thus

makes them celestial wanderers, at the same time bringing them to redemptive perfection by his magic look. Finally he proposes to the princess that she herself "wander" with him. She consents. A garden festival is arranged for the solemn sacrifice of the two. They are broken on the wheel and then burned. The following morning they are still seen as spectres dancing in the flames.

In his next rebirth Nā-Ro-Pa is seen playing among children. In this incarnation he receives further instruction from his beloved teacher Ti-Lo-Pa through songs. The legend closes with a lofty paean of praise for the redemptive power of the great Nā-Ro-Pa, and describes how his material body is finally changed, under strains of music, into the body of a rainbow and slowly vanishes in the heavens.

Grünwedel himself says his only purpose in publishing a series of Tibetan texts is that Europeans might experience a strong revulsion from these "detestable bestialities." Hence in reality he finds it "distasteful" to himself to translate this "evil, most atrocious, most cruel, unspeakably vulgar, despicable book," which teaches "repulsive symbols" and "depraved views" with "brazen hypocrisy."

But the author really makes the texts what he condemns them for being by his method of procedure, in that he effaces the rituals with which they deal. These are not studied and thoroughly understood. The false fear is entertained that further uncovering of the psychological background of such cults and myths might reveal materials even more shocking and detestable. On the contrary, such a radical attempt at clarification would be the proper way to undemonize the suspected and misinterpreted texts.

On the whole the translation of the text is well done and unobjectionable. Only occasionally is the author's complex-bias evident, e.g., when *Yoga* and *Tantra* are simply translated "magic," and *Dākinī* is translated "witch," the interpretation of the text is from the outset negatively fixed and limited.*

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* Translation by F. W. Schneider.

God and the Social Process: A Study in Hebrew History. By Louis Wallis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935. xv + 353 pp. $2.00.

The purpose of this book by the author of the *Sociological Study of the Bible* is to give "a new picture of Hebrew history and a new sense of the social forces animating the evolution of scriptural monotheism." He believes that beginning with the time of Gideon, North Israel developed a double, higher and lower, aristocracy or *baalim*. At first there was relative equality among these *baalim*, based upon the "mishpat-idea that the *source of life* (i.e., land, water, etc.) is communal and rightly not commercial (i.e., not to be disposed of by private persons through sale or exchange)" (p. 58). Gradually, due to contact with the "Amorites" and the circumstances of settled life, Hebrew society was divided into rich *baalim* and poor *baalim*, and the latter were often forced to sell themselves and their families to the rich. Thus emerged a social situation which led to the rise of the "insurgent prophets," like Elijah, Micaiah, Elisha, Amos, and Hosea, who took up the cause of the poor *baalim*, and sought to reestablish the equalitarianism and the communalism of the original nomadic life of the Hebrews.

The purpose and the general thesis of the author are indeed commendable. The usual studies of the Bible are devoted almost wholly to the task of discovering some hypothetical "religious development," or to that of constructing a political and military history of the Hebrew people. They overlook the elementary concern of flesh and blood Hebrews with their "bread and butter." Hebrew religion was the religion of a people who were occupied constantly with the problem of living, with cattle and crops, with their wine, olive, and wool, and with keeping themselves alive in a land exposed to raid and invasion. Hence, histories of Hebrew religion which overlook the economic aspect of Hebrew life are really nonsense. One *might* study Plato or the Upanishads with little regard for Greek or Hindu life, but not the Old Testament.

An adequate recognition of social conflict in Israel after the reign of the powerful king Omri is absolutely necessary for the understanding of Elijah, Jehu's revolution, Amos, Hosea, and the Covenant or (as it is called in this book) "Mishpat" Code. Also, one cannot understand the prophecies of Isaiah, Micah, and Jeremiah, and the reforma-

tion under king Josiah, without being aware that "backsliding Israel hath showed herself more righteous than treacherous Judah." Hence, chapters IX and X of this book, dealing with "Mishpat Struggle in Ephraim" and "Mishpat in Judah," throw a great deal of light upon pre-exilic Hebrew prophecy. One only wishes that the several prophets under consideration had been dealt with more adequately. This book makes it evident that a sociological interpretation of Hebrew prophecy can hardly do justice to the peculiar genius of each prophet. It is significant that the prophets' own claim that they were speaking "the word of God" receives no attention from the author. Therefore it is hard to see why this book is considered a "new adventure in the field of historical theology."

The discussion of "mishpat" previous to the division of the United Kingdom is rather belabored and unconvincing. Much that is written on tribal movements and tribal relations seems to have no immediate and clear connection with the subject of the book. However, these sections contain interesting conjectures on the significance of the patriarchal, especially of the Joseph, stories. In the stories about Gideon, Abimelech, Samuel, Saul, David, and Nabal, the author discovers a "peasant aristocracy" among the Hebrews both north and south of Jerusalem. He believes that this aristocracy was founded on "mishpat," and opposed to the commercial baalism of the Amorites, who were supplanted forcibly as in Jericho and Shechem. David "broadened the structure of the Josephite monarchy to include the baalistic Amorites and their walled cities with the framework of the Hebrew nation" (p. 142). It is also conjectured that in David's time, as against the earlier Josephite period, there was a tendency "toward the formation of a *pantheon* embracing Yahweh and other gods in a single group" (p. 140). But the evidence given in this connection is very meagre. It may still be true that the syncretism found in Judges 6, 8-9 was not dominant during the reigns of Saul and David. This is the least convincing section of the book.

According to our author, "the successive codes imbedded in the Law prove that the ethical monotheism of the Bible is a development, or evolution, of ideas relating to social justice and personal morality" (p. 304). Unfortunately, he does not give a clear description of the way in which the "mishpat" struggle led to the evolution of monotheism and universalism. So far as we can discern, the conflict between

Yahwism and baalism led to *henotheism*. Monotheism as seen in Amos and Isaiah was due directly to the conviction that Yahwe had authority over nations other than the Hebrews. Besides, the tortuous course of Hebrew thought does not fit into any neat scheme of "evolving ideals." We feel that a more objective and orderly study of Hebrew social life is very much needed. Perhaps attention to the concern of the Hebrew people *as a whole* with the necessities of life, as well as the study of economic conflict in Hebrew society, would give us a more satisfactory view of the relation between "God and the Social Process."

However, this is one of the few suggestive books on the Old Testament produced in America during recent years.

Joseph Haroutunian

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The Heritage of the Cathedral. By Sartell Prentice. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1936. xxii + 328 pp. with 33 plates, 8 diagrams. $3.50.

Cathedral: A Gothic Pilgrimage. By Helen Huss Parkhurst. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1936. xiii + 304 pp. with 46 plates. $4.00.

Countless books have been written on cathedrals, for the most part from the architectural and historical points of view; but in the volumes here under consideration, the approach is somewhat different. Dr. Prentice is concerned primarily with the origin and development of the cathedral structure, whose origins he traces far back into the pre-Christian era; Miss Parkhurst's interest is rather in the æsthetic meaning of the cathedral and in the subjective impressions which she gains from it. Both authors rightly derive the cathedral from the Roman basilica, which, it may be remembered in passing, likewise gave rise to certain types of early Jewish synagogues. The difficult problem of the origin of the transept is discussed at some length by Dr. Prentice, who suggests that, after Christianity became the state religion under Constantine, the large influx of the clergy (many of whom had sought ordination to escape from heavy taxes) required additional room to accommodate them. Next, to admit more light and to improve the acoustic properties for the congregations, the architraves were replaced by arches; and with the increasing interest in pilgrimages, ambulatories were constructed to permit passage from transept to transept. At the

same time, the apses were adapted for chapels, which not only provided for additional Masses, but also for the veneration of relics.

With the decay of the catechumenate and the prevalence of infant baptism, the atrium, the successor of the old court before the basilica, disappeared; and the ablution-fountain which had stood in the atrium was transferred to the entrance of the church, where it still stands, either as the holy-water stoup or as the baptistery. With the disappearance of the atrium, the bare façade of the basilica remained. Hence, towers were erected to break the monotony, first at various points, at last chiefly on the west front; and in the ninth century the old wooden roofs were replaced by stone because of frequent disastrous fires. Such, in rough outline, was the birth of the Romanesque cathedral, which was essentially monastic in spirit. The further evolution to Gothic was due primarily to the development of vaulting. The old barrel vault gradually became more and more pointed to avoid the lateral thrust and to permit a downward pressure, thus allowing less massive walls and larger windows. With the rise of city life and the increase of wealth in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, monasticism retired more and more to isolated spots, and in the great centres increasing attention was paid to the cathedral rather than to the monastery. This was the period of the great development of Gothic, which was essentially the creation of the secular rather than of the regular clergy, and was particularly favoured by the civil authorities. With the intellectual revival which followed the Dark Ages, not only architecture but stained glass came to adorn the cathedral. There was, too, a marvellous development of symbolism, so that each and every part of the cathedral structure could be interpreted not only as a material thing, but as a mystic teaching; the process being not unlike the well-known fourfold interpretation of the Bible: historical for actual events; allegorical for anticipation of events in later time; tropological for moral teaching and improvement of the moral character; and analogical to lead the soul on its upward way to eternal life.

In the fourteenth century, the situation changed. Scholastic argumentations and negations led to scepticism; the clergy had in too many cases become corrupt; while the devastation of the Hundred Years' War and the Black Death accelerated the decline with resulting recklessness and morbid dread of death as shown in the *dance macabre*. The effect of this upon the cathedral Dr. Prentice would trace in the

flamboyant, which he regards as indicative of a reckless gratification of the senses born of despair, while he thinks that the meticulousness of the perpendicular is indicative of the loss of faith. Whether this explanation is necessary does not seem quite certain; flamboyant architecture may at least equally well be interpreted as an attempt to "gild the lily." Renaissance architecture, being merely an artificial revival of a classical spirit long since dead, marks the decline of cathedral architecture. It was essentially destructive; and artistic sense is still only too frequently offended by the sight of Gothic arches mutilated into lifeless Renaissance.

In the second part of Dr. Prentice's work, he goes far back into history. The apse and square end alike he finds in the Azilian period (10,000 to 8,000 B.C.); the origin of holy water he sees in the cleansing property of water, in the Power of the Name recited over it, and in the deity dwelling within it; the chancel screen protected the images of saints; the altar rail kept the unconsecrated from the sanctuary; and the bells were originally to frighten demons away.

On page 200, one finds the misprint of Bactrian for batrachian; and on page 272, the quotation from Statius (*Thebaid* iii, 661) should read, "Primus in orbe deos fecit timor," while its translation should be, "Fear was the first to make gods in the world." There is also a somewhat misleading footnote on page 227 which seems to imply that the *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum* of Durandus has been translated into English. Only the first and the third books have so been rendered, the first by J. M. Neale and B. Webb, and the third by T. H. Passmore.

. . . . . .

Miss Parkhurst's book, at first sight, involuntarily suggests the *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* of Henry Adams, but in reality the two volumes are entirely different. Perhaps the best chapter is the fifth, "The Mediaeval Scene," which gives an excellent survey of the dark side, as well as of the light, and is particularly happy in its comparison and antithesis of Eve and the Blessed Virgin. Like Dr. Prentice, Miss Parkhurst traces the various components of the cathedral to very early sources. Occasionally, however, she seems to give much rein to fancy, and in other places one is not quite sure that she may not have made some error. Is it wholly certain, for example (page 10),

that Persia knew both vaults and domes long before the Romans and the Mycenaeans? And would not covered places of assembly and worship (page 17) have been required by the Church from the very first, even if for no other reason than the necessity of hiding Christian worship from enemies in times of persecution? Whether the Romanesque is feminine or not (pages 37, 38) is, perhaps, matter of opinion. The present reviewer can only say that this style has always seemed to him quite devoid of the grace and slenderness so characteristic of the fairer sex; the only time that a cathedral has ever even remotely suggested to him an "all-procreative earth-mother" was when at Chartres he prosaically remembered that the structure was built on the site of a Celtic shrine to a *mater*. If he were to indulge in poetry, he would compare churches and cathedrals alike to the angels, as "messengers" of God and above all sex! Neither has it ever seemed to him that the Romanesque was a mountain of stone, and the Gothic of ice (pages 64, 65).

Much more serious is the statement (page 46) that "the altar was originally a tomb and that in ritual usage this association still clings to it." As matter of fact, the altar was primarily a table (or, in isolated instances, a depression in the ground) where sacrifice was offered to a deity. The fact that relics of saints and the like are placed within the altar, or even that a saint may be buried beneath it, simply adds to the sanctity of the altar, whose primary purpose remains the place of offering of a sacrifice. A number of minor errors may be noted in passing. There was scarcely a Kymric element in any of the stocks which later inhabited France, unless by "Kymric" is meant Brythonic Celts, in which case the term is quite superfluous; and the Phoenician infusion must have been quite insignificant (page 87). On pages 199 and 200, it might perhaps have been better to reprint E. Caswall's standard English translations of St. Thomas Aquinas's "Pange, lingua, gloriosi" and King Robert's "Veni, Sancte Spiritus," found, for instance, in *Hymns Ancient and Modern* and in the new American *Hymnal*, particularly in view of the marvellously faithful rendering of the fourth stanza of the "Pange, lingua":

Verbum caro, panem verum	Word-made-Flesh true bread He maketh
Verbo carnem efficit	By His Word His Flesh to be

On page 244, she has confused the Trinity with the triad, a confusion resting merely on the fact that both contain the number three, whereas the Christian Trinity, as her own citations from the Athanasian Creed should have shown her, is unique, and constitutes an inseparable entity, which is by no means the case with the non-Christian triad.

Her chapter entitled "Enduring Symbols" on survivals of paganism in Christianity is one of particular interest, though it contains little not already known to specialists on the subject. But her theory that the Blessed Virgin is peculiarly appropriate to receive the dedication of a cathedral seems open to some criticism. The history of the cathedral indicates that dedications to the Blessed Virgin are not found in the earliest period, and it was probably not until after her cult had become—for most excellent reasons—so highly popular in the Middle Ages that Our Lady became the favourite patron not only of the cathedral, but of many parish churches. The reviewer cannot refrain from a word of protest against the title of the last chapter of part two, "Word Made Flesh" (*Verbum caro factum est*). Referring exclusively to the Incarnation of our Lord, and so sacred to the Catholic, whether Roman or Anglican, that he genuflects whenever these words are read in the Mass, it is quite shocking to find them applied to representation in stone or glass of saints, or even of God the Father and God the Holy Ghost, or of the Blessed Virgin. Just how cathedrals can be compared with skyscrapers (pages 253-254) is not quite clear, except that the skyscraper is always high and the cathedral frequently is. The prosaic reason for the height of the skyscraper is the necessity of economising ground-space, but however the terrain may condition the size and shape of the cathedral, mere saving of space is not the cause of its loftiness.

Psychologically, both volumes are highly interesting. The authors clearly love their subject, and have made every possible effort to do it full justice. The books are a wealth of information to the intelligent general reader, and deserve much praise; and yet internal evidence shows that both authors, though intelligent and profound, are viewing their theme, so to speak, from the outside, and not simultaneously from the outside and the inside. The cathedral seems not to be quite part and parcel of them, and one does not feel that they have so completely absorbed and entered into the inner feeling of their theme as did, for instance, Henry Osborn Taylor in his *The Mediaeval*

Mind, an achievement the more remarkable if, as the reviewer has been told, Mr. Taylor is not himself a Catholic, either Anglican or Roman.

One final question suggests itself. Is it possible profitably to study the history of the cathedral without investigating at the same time the history of the parish church? In certain ways it might seem that the parish church is more primitive than is the cathedral. The cathedral arose, it is held, from the basilica. The origin of the parish church, like that of its predecessor, the pagan temple, would seem rather to have been a house, so that the church was in essence very literally the "house of God," whereas the cathedral may have been conceived as a court of majesty, justice, and worship. We may, in all probability, go even further, and say that the monastery, with its complex of church, refectory, dormitory, and the rest, was evolved from the Roman *villa* and its Greek counterparts. The private chapels found in palaces, manors, and the like (e.g., St. John's in the Tower of London) may be regarded as similar survivals from very early Christian times; and all investigators of the history of the architecture of the Church should weigh carefully the words of Mgr. Duchesne (*Origines du culte chrétien*, 5th ed., Paris, 1909, p. 406): "Les églises primitives n'ont été d'abord que des maisons ordinaires, spécialement affectées au culte chrétien, ou plutôt à l'ensemble des services de la communauté chrétienne."

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Histoire générale de l'Ordre de Saint François. Tome I. By Fr. de Sessevalle. Editions de La Revue de l'histoire franciscaine. Paris: Hachette, 1935. xiii + 679 pp. Fr. 85.

Of books concerning the Poverello and his Order there is no end. The more the better, even though the abundance provoke a smile when one reflects that to the saint the allurements of learning presented a peril second only to that of wealth. To such allurements the Order almost at once succumbed, so that this latest of its historians, reviewing the intellectual achievement of the sons of Francis in the middle ages, can deliberately describe this phase of their work as its chief glory. If the remark is likely to make the saint turn in his grave, it is none the less natural, as one pauses awestruck before the Franciscan output,

not only of writings by the friars themselves, but of books about them. Ever since the publication of Sabatier's *Life* in 1894, the modern flow of histories, magazines, critical monographs, has gone on increasing.

The present work is the first volume of a projected complete history of the Order; it covers the period 1209 to 1517. The author, "Directeur de la Revue d'histoire franciscaine," is a French nobleman whose wealth, talents and social eminence have been devoted to Franciscan history. A student delving into that history encounters many fascinating books: Gratien's *Histoire de la fondation et de l'evolution de l'Ordre des Frères Mineurs au XIII^e Siècle,* Father Cuthbert's *History of the Capuchins,* Father Hilary Felder's *Geschichte der Wissendchaftlichen im Franziscaner Orden bis um die Mitte des 13 Jahrhunder* to name two or three only. But such study as is here attempted of the whole sweep of the movement inspired by Francis, was still to seek. So says Joergensen, who introduces the book in a few charming pages. "Vous êtes le seul qui avez résolu l'épineux problème de reproduire son oeuvre à travers les siècles."

Part I of the volume is historical; Part II, "La Spiritualité franciscaine" opens with chapters rich in detail, on liturgical usages and on distinctive devotional practises which, inaugurated within the Order, have become part of the general Christian heritage. Growing more cursory as it goes on, the book proceeds to enumerate Franciscan saints and Beatified, and the writers of the Order. Part III, "La Science franciscaine," reviews with greater fullness though with inevitable compression the intellectual activities, the establishment of Studia connected with the Universities in all the widely scattered Provinces of the Order, and the outstanding scholars and thinkers who glorified it. Two chapters are then devoted to presenting the friars as champions of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception; and the volume concludes with treatment, inevitably slight though giving some interesting notes concerning sundry churches, of Franciscan poetry and art.

The problem which the author has faced is indeed "*épineux.*" Curious evidence of the vitality of the Franciscan movement is afforded by the fact that nobody can write about it without bias. The epoch-making book of Paul Sabatier was marred in his first edition, by a tendency, not indeed like some feebler writers to treat St. Francis as a precursor of Protestantism, but to stress unduly the tension between the saint and ecclesiastical authorities. The tendency was entirely corrected in

the Notes, left alas unfinished at Sabatier's death, in which the passionate and central loyalty of Francis to the Church receives full recognition. In the book before us, the tendency is all the other way, the picture is seen within the clearly defined horizons of rigid Catholic orthodoxy. The first eight chapters naturally invite comparison with the delightful history of the same period, already mentioned, by Père Gratien. They tell the same story; both give of course the transformation of a lay group into a virtually clerical order, both present the stubborn conflict between the friars and the secular clergy. If M. de Sessevalle is less readable, it is partly because the larger scale of his work demanded greater compression; but the fact is also due to his greater conventionality of outlook. For example, that agonizing struggle to obey the Gospels literally, in which the friars are not alone but are among the most prominent and touching protagonists, might hardly have existed so far as this book is concerned. The contention during the first Franciscan century over Francis' ideal of poverty, is not of course ignored by M. de Sessevalle; but it is subordinated to other interests, while in Gratien it is salient and central. Sessevalle lightly discredits the authority of Francis' Will, having of course Papal authority, dating from Gregory XI, for so doing. He does not even analyze the differences between the Rules of 1221 and 1223; and, concerning the latter deprecates quite frankly the "littéralisme mortel" which in his mind doomed the Order to protracted and futile anguish. To add one other small instance it is interesting to compare the attitude toward Aurioli, in this book and in Gratien. To Sessevalle, this doctor is chiefly notable for his "rétablissment du nominalisme," to Gratien for his extraordinary attitude toward the "Usus Pauper." Aurioli, as Gratien reports him, said that the friars could practise as much luxury as they liked without offending Poverty, so long as they did not own the title to their possessions. Is this the position which de Sessevalle characterizes as "une opinion moyenne et modérée"? (S. P. 566, Gratien, P. 398.)

The perplexities of the friars concerning private property would seem more relevant to our modern interests than the constitutional development of the Order. But it is on the latter that the high light here falls. We have admirably careful study of all legal developments, and of the successive stages of organization, marked by Papal Bulls and by sundry enactments, through which the Order attained

maturity, assumed final form, and spread through the civilized world. All this is of great importance and value. But again the author's bias shows in his contemptuous minimizing of the Spirituals, or Zelanti. True, as he justly points out, these radicals were always few in number and confined to two or three Provinces only; true also that the Zealot was a man over whose head Papal expositions had slipped unheeded. But it is hard to forget how much Francis would have loved him; and since when have minorities ceased to be of interest? . . . M. de Sessevalle thinks that devotion to Joachism rather than to Poverty was the distinctive mark of the Spirituals. He may be right; a prophetic instinct, an intense straining toward the future, is almost always a note of groups to the Left. But Joachism itself is here dismissed with merely perfunctory allusions, although it was a strong influence not only with the extremists but with men like Adam March and John of Parma. No reference is given even in notes to the illuminating study of the Calabrian abbot by men like Ernesto Buonaiuti; albeit the whole inner history of the later middle ages was as we begin to see affected by strong undercurrents flowing from Joachim's revolutionary thought, through the Franciscan Order and beyond, and leaving a heritage operative to this day.

It is hard, again, not to regret the slurring treatment afforded to a figure like Angelo Clareno, dismissed with a belittling reference here and there, and to those followers of his whom during his life he so carefully protected from the inroads of heresy. Angelo's *Historia Septem Tribulationum Ordinis Minorum*[1] does not deserve, if only from the point of view of literary excellence, to be so completely discredited. An obviously partisan work, it might at least receive recognition in the chapter on Franciscan literature, on the mere score of its dramatic vitality. The author seems also hardly fair to the merits of Ubertino di Casale's erratic but impressive book, *Arbor Vitae Crucifixae Jesu*. On the other hand, a contrast to the generally unsympathetic treatment of the more restive elements in the Order is found in an appreciative discussion of Pierre Jean Olivi; a discussion which quickens desire for more familiarity with that original mind at once so brave and so well balanced.

1. The present writer owns of this work, never published in its entirety, a precious manuscript copy made under the supervision of Paul Sabatier and enriched by his personal annotations.

Perhaps it was as well to concentrate on the formal development of the Order and to treat the insurgent elements in it rather lightly; for there has possibly been a tendency, not only in non-Catholic writers but in men like Gratien and René de Nantes, to exaggerate the importance of the latter. The story after the consummation of the struggle with John XXII is well told. The period of decadence after the Black Death is impressively and unsparingly presented, as are the subsequent spiritual wakening, and the confused and diverse attempts at reform. The author's sympathies are never with the radicals, but they are strongly with those elements which in long victorious tussle with plain moral degeneration honestly sought all possible allegiance to the ideals of Francis, within the limits of that commonsense which is alas! always dictating compromise, in this difficult world. The great landmarks stand out clearly, the most important documents are quoted, and the confusion is to a considerable degree disentangled. The story in this volume ends with the Leonine settlement of 1517, which achieved the consolidation of the diverse groups into the two great divisions which exist to this day. We await in the next volume the story, already admirably told by Father Cuthbert, of the rise of the Capuchins, and also the heroic tale of Franciscan missions.

Parts II and III of the book resolve themselves largely into catalogues, laborious but sometimes uncritical. Not even the most Protestant reader can really resent the unanalyzed chronicle of all the miracles of the sundry Beati, yet it is a pity that the survey of these holy ones is too rapid to allow any touches of life. But in his study of the scholars of the Order, M. de Sessevalle, leaning to great degree on Gilson and Felder, is at his best. The succinct summaries are excellent. Not only the great lights appear—Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon, Bonaventura—but many others, whose names are often forgotten, whose writings have sometimes perished, but of whom sufficient record remains to demonstrate the work done by the Order in maintaining, while rendering more flexible, the Augustinian tradition, and also in breaking new trails for Christian thought. The mere painstaking list of Studia established is noteworthy. No one can read this list and fail to feel quickened regard for the achievement of the friars in developing an international fellowship of scholars, such as can always form a bond of unity in a distracted world.

One notes with surprise some bibliographical omissions, and may

be pardoned for finding the absence of references to non-Catholic authorities disappointing. M. Sabatier can not be ignored by any one; A. G. Little appears in an occasional footnote. But as a rule the work of English scholars is inadequately recognized. One looks for instance in vain for reference to the fine monograph on St. Louis of Toulouse by Dr. Margaret Toynbee, to the valuable study of Dr. D. E. Sharpe on Franciscan philosophy at Oxford, or to various other volumes of that admirable British Society of Franciscan Studies, the work of which is now unfortunately drawing to a close. Noting such omissions, one questions a little whether the author has made good his claim to have utilized all that has been published.

As to the treatment of Franciscan authors themselves, a reviewer must be on guard against his own tastes. Yet in the relatively full discussion of Peckham, mention would have been welcomed of his exquisite little autobiographical *Canticum Pauperis pro Dilecto;* and Ramund Lull's marvelous novel *Blanquerna* surely deserved more than a mere listing. It seems a pity moreover that the unique quality of certain among the Spiritual classics should be belittled: that the *Sacrum Commercium* should be dismissed as an "idylle étrange"—("Dira-t'-on qu'elle depeint l'idéal de la vie franciscaine? A Dieu ne plaise"). As literature, the *Speculum* is also undervalued. However misguided be the ideals inspiring these works, they remain in imaginative charm among the chief treasures bequeathed to us by the middle ages.

Yet if the presentation of Franciscan poetry and art in the last chapters seems slight, and the treatment of a major figure like Jacopone da Todi rather thin, it is to be remembered that the scale of the book required constant condensation, and also that these subjects have attracted far more study than the firm constitutional development, here presented with as satisfactory fullness as space allowed, which has ensured the continuity and the survival to this day of a noble Order. It is ungrateful business to talk of what a book does not give. If M. de Sessevalle's method seems at times mechanical and external, he has at all events given us a reservoir of information for which all Franciscan students must be grateful. His volume is one to be kept on the shelves and treasured for reference. For such purpose—to end with one last note of regret—the absence of an index is to be lamented; but it

is a lack which will surely be supplied in the later volumes for which we shall watch with eagerness.

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Survey of a Decade: The Third Order of St. Francis in the United States. By MAXIMUS POPPY, O.F.M., and PAUL M. MARTIN, M.A., St. Louis: B. Herder, 1935. xxi + 803 + lxi pp. $3.50.

This dignified volume of 803 pages is devoted to the inspiring story of the development of the Third Order of St. Francis in the United States during the decade 1921-1931. Of the two distinguished Tertiaries who have compiled the material, Father Maximus Poppy is secretary of the National Executive Board, while the layman, Paul A. Martin, is known as author of *The Gospel in Action: The Third Order Secular of St. Francis and Christian Social Reform,* (Milwaukee, 1932). The first part of this volume, "A Chronicle of Progress," tells the story of the Order in this country from the beginning till the close of the Third National Congress held in San Francisco in 1931. Papers and reports from this congress and the preceding, held in New York in 1926, occupy the body of the book, which ends with certain useful Papers of Reference. Among these are included the Rule, and diverse Papal pronouncements, which from Leo XIII's famous "Auspicato" in 1882, have not ceased to urge on the Catholic world the extension of this Third Order, as the most hopeful means of correcting the evil of the times, and recalling Christian civilization to virtuous practises and to the paths of peace.

Of course the Popes are right. If all men and women would become faithful Franciscan Tertiaries, most of our lamentable difficulties would vanish. Self control and temperance in the spirit of evangelical poverty, the exercise of brotherly love toward all men, and above all that religious devotion which can alone sustain and guarantee the Good Life—such abiding and tried ideals can not be invoked too often or furthered by too many agencies. They involve, as is here said, "no more nor less than the observance of the Gospel." There are now about ninety-five thousand Tertiaries in the United States, representing a large number of racial groups; one is assured that they must be making a valued contribution to such good work, for instance, as that

of the Legion of Decency. Turning these pages, one is impressed by the similarity of the ideals to those of a popular movement, Protestant in genesis. The "Oxford Groups," insisting like the Tertiaries on individual salvation as the basis for any social action, reiterate with the earnestness of fresh discovery the ancient summons to absolute purity, honesty, unselfishness and love; and the amazing spread of their movement testifies, like the ninety-five thousand Tertiaries, to the unfailing and eager readiness of human nature to respond to any noble call. Putting the two movements side by side, advantage might for several reasons be claimed by the Tertiaries. Theirs is the glorious and fortifying tradition, constantly invoked, from the days of Francis through the great roll call of his followers; theirs all resources of beautiful and rich symbolism in which the precepts of plain morality can be adorned. The imaginative, as the human appeal, is deeper and more varied; no one can read unmoved the account of the memorial services held in remembrance of the Tertiary departed. And the spiritual disciplines imposed, such as are accredited through the ages by the wisdom of an ancient Church, compare favorably in efficiency with the rather naïve selection of such disciplines current in the recent movement. The stress on the necessity of clerical guidance, by the Franciscan leaders, is more debatable; recalling the originally lay character of the Franciscan family, one is not sure. But in almost all ways, the Franciscan movement shows a solidity and sanity, and a psychological insight, not always evinced in the religious movements of Protestantism.

Yet both movements leave something still to seek. Nothing more can be demanded of spiritual revivals than that they open afresh ancient sources of inspiration. But viewed from without it seems terribly hard for such revivals to escape the platitude. Most of the papers presented at these Congresses of the Third Order are dull reading; their adjurations are so excellent, and so obvious, and they all say so much the same thing. This is equally true of the Oxford groups. Honesty, purity, unselfishness: *connu.* But the field of originality is that of application, and only when this field is entered, can reiteration cease to be tedious. In the middle ages, that field was again and again entered by the Third Order as by the first. It shared its Founder's spirit of adventure, and one writer after another quotes with just pride the Tertiary contribution toward the break up of feudalism,

by the prohibition to bear arms laid on its members and by the egalitarian arrangement about wills. Leo XIII in 1883 revised the Rule; and there is nothing in it now that could possibly startle or offend anybody. A number of the speakers here represented are however earnestly feeling their way; Senator Walsh of Montana for instance, in a capital address on "The Economic Encyclicals and Tertiarism," is fully aware of the sort of world in which the Third Order has to function, and of the opportunities before it. There are other passages in this book, which might well give the great mass of Tertiaries their marching orders. And if one passes outside the limits of this volume, it is easy to discover how sensitive are certain Franciscan leaders to the collective possibilities of the Order. Father Marion Habig for instance, who supplies the topical index here, presented a brilliant paper to the Franciscan Education Conference of 1935. Anxiously delimiting the scope of the Third Order, in loyal allegiance to the Papal rulings that neither the political nor the economic field be entered, he yet stated clearly that individual sanctification should lead to distinctive social attitude and action; and quoted with approval a passage from Father Cuthbert's *Ideals of St. Francis*, as pertinent now as when it was written:

"Is it too much to ask Franciscan Tertiaries to pledge themselves to strive after justice in dealing with their neighbors; . . . to consider before they demand cheap goods whether such goods can be sold cheaply without decreasing the fair wage of the laborer; to pay a 'human wage' when they hire labor; and to give a just return in labor for wages received? Such a pledge today would correspond with the civic pledge demanded of the first Tertiaries by St. Francis. Then it was the free use of arms which caused the misery; now it is the selfish use of open competition."

That Father Maximus Poppy, is equally alive to possibilities, is evident from remarks of his during the same conference:

"One reason why the Third Order does not catch on today, is that we fail to appraise and interpret pointedly its congenital applicability to modern conditions. . . . In our application of the terms of the Rule, we keep to generalities—at best to generalities about Tertiary moderation and piety and charity, applying them in terms that apply to Christians universally. We do not see and preach the terms of the Rule in the light of their specific application, as in the middle ages, when very specific regulations gave point to Tertiarism by thrusting, purposely or otherwise, directly at the heart of an iniquitous system. In the modification of the Rule by Leo XIII,

these specific regulations were quite properly eliminated as irrelevant. But Leo insisted that the spirit which prompted them was not to be regarded as modified.

"The thing to do, therefore, to give Tertiarism point today . . . is to regard the Leonine Rule as a basic Rule . . . and to give it interpretation in a code of special regulations."

For such regulations we are still waiting, not too hopefully. Father Maximus goes on to say what obstacles to forming them intervene, in the individualism which prevails among Tertiaries as everywhere else. It is painfully easy to repose upon the platitude! We may be very thankful for the movement as it is, here presented with ample detail and refreshing enthusiasm. But one dares to wish for more. Here is a real order, as writer after writer emphasizes; possessing dynamic resources quite transcending those of any ordinary society, religious or secular. Without leaving the limits of the great social Encyclicals from "Rerum Novarum" to "Quadragesimo Anno," without succumbing to communism or even flirting with it, that Order might go a long way toward realizing the high hopes for its power of social redemption entertained by Leo XIII, who said: "I expect the rebirth of the world and the welfare of the social order from the activity of the Third Order" and again: "It is the Third Order of St. Francis which can renew the face of the earth."

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Die Theologie der Böhmischen Brüder in Ihrer Frühzeit. By ERHARD PESCHKE. Vol. I. "Das Abendmahl." Stuttgart-Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1935. xvii + 383 pp. RM 21.

An interesting piece of research is presented here by Dr. Erhard Peschke, who has very fully reconstructed the history of the Protestant interpretation of the sacrament of Holy Communion. In his account of this important doctrine Dr. Peschke begins with the interpretation of John Wyclif, the English Reformer and his subsequent influence on Protestant thought.

Although Wyclif's teaching which denied any change of substance in the consecrated elements of the Lord's Supper, was nearly extinct in England after some forty years, his truest tradition was promoted in Bohemia, where his works were eagerly read and multiplied. Wyc-

lif was not given the esteem he deserved in England, but John Hus, his disciple, raised Wyclifism to a place of dignity in Bohemia.

The teachings of Hus were forbidden at the Synods of the Church in Bohemia, and when he was burned at the stake in 1415, the question of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper became a prominent issue. Dr. Peschke points out that Bohemian Wyclifism was not a united movement but, "a house divided against itself." The author makes clear that the fundamental ideas of John Hus are borrowed from Wyclif and that many of his writings were taken verbatim from his teacher. Of special interest is Dr. Peschke's observation that instead of being the exponent of Wyclif's teaching on the sacrament of Holy Communion, Hus taught the orthodox Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation, although one of the reasons advanced for condemning him to the stake was that he had taught and preached Wyclifism on this point.

The movement of Hus received new impetus with his death, and concomitant with it new interpreters of Wyclif. The author's particular interest, however, is their interpretation of Wyclif on the doctrine of Holy Communion. The views of these leaders in the pre-Reformation movement in Bohemia which Dr. Peschke relates at considerable length, are based upon original research. The chief of these followers of Hus and interpreters of Wyclif are Matthias von Janov, Thomas Stitnys, Jacob von Mies, J. Rokycana, Peter Chelcicky, and Lucas von Prag. Each had their following, and their interpretations of Wyclif were greater in their difference than in their resemblance. The disagreeing parties of the Bohemian brethren all had Wyclif as their authority, and, therefore, none of the factions were uninfluenced by his teaching. Each group was convinced that they had understood Wyclif correctly. However, they were all followers of Hus and interpreters of Wyclif, and when restrictions were laid upon the freedom of conscience by the Catholic Church, they led the Nationalists of Bohemia in the revolt, which resulted in the Hussite war.

In the course of time the admirers of Hus split into two factions—the Utraquists and the Taborites. The purpose of the former was restricted to restoring the cup of communion to the laity, whereas that of the latter was a reformation of the entire Church. War between these two parties resulted in the establishment of the Utraquists as the National Church of Bohemia. However, in Prague a band of

Utraquists, under the preaching of Rokycana and others, especially from among the Taborites, pledged themselves to practise purity and piety according to the ideals of Hus. In 1456 these retreated to Kunwald, with Gregory the Patriarch as their leader and teacher, and in the following year they adopted a formal statement of their principles. The history of the Moravian Church, also called the United Brethren or Unitas Fratrum, begins with this date.

The Moravian Church from its inception followed very largely the interpretations of Lucas von Prag. And when Martin Luther sounded the call to a reformation in the Church, his views especially on the sacrament of Holy Communion were to a large extent shaped and modified by these pre-Reformation leaders. Thus the spirit of Wyclif had its influence on the Lutheran and Reformed Churches of Europe. Dr. Peschke's research is an important contribution to knowledge in that he has traced from original sources the influences that gave shape and form to the Protestant interpretation of the doctrine of Holy Communion.

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The Right to Heresy. By Stephan Zweig. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: The Viking Press, 1936. 238 pp. $3.00.

Castellio is taking his place along with Mary Stuart, Marie Antoinette and Erasmus of Rotterdam. He is a nobler figure than any of them. Zweig brings to his task a gift for interesting and picturesque writing. Of Calvin we read, "Vainly does the prophet's beard strive to give this bilious countenance the semblance of virile energy. The sparse hairs, like the skin of the face to which they are attached, have no sap in them; they do not flow majestically downwards, like the beard of Moses in the old paintings, but sprout thinly, a mournful thicket growing on ungrateful soil." A masterpiece that! Zweig has in fact every qualification for a significant achievement except a mastery of the field. The book abounds in errors and inconsistencies, and even if they were all corrected it would still be amateurish. Calvin is caricatured as a Mephistopheles unrelieved and Castellio as an angel of light unblemished. Tragedy is turned into melodrama.

Take inconsistencies. On p. 4 we read that "nothing could happen in the political world without Calvin's knowledge; very little could

happen there in defiance of his will. It had become as dangerous to offend the preacher of St. Pierre as to offend emperor or pope." On p. 126 we read that during the trial of Servetus "Calvin was only too well aware that his authority was shaken and might fall." As a matter of fact he was in danger of banishment. Not until after the events described in this book did he attain dominance in Geneva. When it came to the rest of the world there was continual friction with Berne, and Calvin at the end of his career could not risk a journey to France to defend the evangelical cause at the colloquy of Poissy (1560).

On p. 122 Zweig tells us that Servetus did not have many friends, admirers and helpers in Geneva, but on the next page we learn that the Libertines, Calvin's political enemies, were plotting on his behalf.

As samples of inaccuracies and misrepresentations take these: Calvin is represented as cruel because of a repressed sex life, and Luther as lenient because satisfied at this point (pp. 46-47). The truth is that the later Luther was almost as severe as Calvin. With regard to the Gruet affair we read (p. 65), "Jacques Gruet was racked and then executed merely for having called Calvin a hypocrite." Williston Walker's version (*John Calvin*, p. 307) is, "On a scrap of paper Gruet had traced the words, 'All laws, divine and human, are made by the caprice of men.' On the margin of a passage in which Calvin had argued the truth of human immortality he had written, 'All nonsense.' "

At one point Zweig appears to have blackened the sixteenth century by attributing to it the intolerance of the twentieth. He declares (p. 57) that the Genevan authorities "opened every letter that entered or left the city." I wish evidence had been given for this statement. I have never seen it elsewhere.

The usual anti-Calvinist picture of the manner in which Servetus was betrayed to the Inquisition is here revamped. The story is that Calvin deliberately sought to deliver his victim into the hands of the papists. The facts are that two cousins, one Catholic, one Protestant, happened to be living one at Lyons, one at Geneva. They had wrangled as to the purity of their respective faiths and disciplines. When the cousin at Geneva found out that Servetus had published near to Lyons a book particularly subversive of the Christian religion in his judgment he could not keep the news and twitted his cousin with it, who promptly went to the inquisitor, only to be told that there

was not sufficient evidence to proceed. A request was sent to Geneva to the Protestant cousin for more. He turned to Calvin, but found him exceedingly loath to yield the necessary documents. In the end Calvin succumbed rather than let down a comrade. He appears thus not as a bloodlusting fanatic, but as a weak-kneed friend. One of the most discreditable elements in the episode in my judgment is that Calvin, when taxed with what he had done, was not straightforward.

This could have been a grand book if Calvin had been portrayed as something greater than a querulous old maid. Really great issues were at stake, though complicated on both sides by personal resentments as great issues usually are. Some of Castellio's principles, if pushed, would have lead to the disruption of the church which Calvin held dear, and for that matter would have undermined civil government at certain points. Calvin feared, not merely the loss of personal authority, but the disintegration of Protestantism. We may feel that the whole Reformation might better have perished than to have been preserved by sending opponents to the stake. I think so myself. But Calvin did not think so, and we must do him the credit of recognizing that he was a highminded man. The most tragic conflicts of history have not been between Mephistopheles and Michael, but between, let us say, Gabriel and Michael. Truth, justice and liberty apparently must be wrought out by the clash of rival idealists. That is the essential tragedy.

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Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez. By Paul Dumont. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1936. vi + 382 pp.

A modern example of the age-long conflict between the followers of the Dominican, Bañez, and the disciples of Molina, the Jesuit, is supplied in this book by the author who is professor of dogmatic theology at the Jesuit scholasticate of Enghien in Belgium. The battle has been raging since the sixteenth century and bids fair to continue indefinitely. The writer takes it for granted that his readers are more or less familiar with the controversy, and that something is known of the principal figures in the drama. Those unacquainted with the details of this long drawn out theological dispute will experience some

difficulty in grasping the full significance of Professor Dumont's arguments.

The problem was raised by the Reformers and the Jansenists who favored predestination at the expense of free will. Catholic theologians could not deny free will, neither could they deny the efficacy of divine grace, hence arose the question regarding their relation. The two principal attempts to reconcile the efficacy of grace with human freedom were those of the Dominicans who advance their theory of predestination and physical premotion, *praemotio physica*, and of the Jesuits who taught the doctrine of mediate knowledge, *scientia media*. The Dominicans seemed to sacrifice liberty, whereas the Jesuits appeared to minimize the effect of grace. The former were suspected of Calvinism, the latter of Pelagianism. The dispute waxed so bitter and violent, that in order to put an end to such a deplorable discord in which each side charged the other with heresy, Pope Clement VIII created in 1598 a special commission, the *Congregatio de Auxiliis*, before which both sides were to debate their views. That did not end the controversy. Each party was permitted to defend its own teaching which is still being done today.

Conventionally those defending the Dominican doctrine of *praemotio physica* are called Thomists, however, since the Dominican, Bañez, is regarded as the founder and chief of the movement they are sometimes called Bannesians, particularly by the author of the present work. The leader of those holding to the theory of *scientia media*, is by common consent the noted Jesuit theologian, Molina, therefore his followers are called Molinists. It should be observed here that both sides claim the support of Thomas Aquinas. Professor Dumont's book is a comparative study of the two opinions, as well as a presentation of Suarez' endeavors to harmonize divine *concursus* with human liberty. Suarez, the celebrated Spanish Jesuit, as is well known, is classed with the Molinists. The author rightly points out that Suarez' espousal of the Molinist's cause is not to be ascribed to prejudice or party spirit, but rather to a profound objective study of the whole matter.

Suarez' doctrine on the freedom of the will is expounded loyally and faithfully enough in the first chapter. In his second chapter Father Dumont argues against Cardinal Gotti and Professor Garrigou-La-

grange that Molina did not claim that his *scientia media* alone could satisfactorily explain the relation between liberty, divine *concursus*, and predestination. The author admits that the doctrine of the *scientia media* was known before the famous *Concordia* of Molina appeared in 1588. It seems that Fonseca originated the doctrine. Still, Professor Dumont evinces that there are numerous texts in the writings of St. Thomas which favor the position of the Molinists. After all, the divine foreknowledge of the future and possible free actions of men is acknowledged by the Bannesians. Molina holds that this precisely is the mediate knowledge of God. The writer next examines Suarez' understanding of what is meant by *scientia media*, while in the fourth chapter he discusses Suarez' attitude toward the *praemotio physica* of the Bannesians. Suarez refutes the arguments in support of physical premotion. Father Dumont holds, despite contrary opinions, that Duns Scotus was hostile to the theory of the Bannesians, and he reveals that Suarez successfully marshalls texts from Thomas Aquinas unfavorable to physical premotion. The author arrives at the conclusion that it would be better to discard the doctrine of physical premotion. He allows that the theory has been toned down by modern Dominicans, some of whom, as Sertillanges, can scarcely be taken for predeterminists.

Suarez was not content with pointing out the defects of the theory of his opponents, but tried to furnish a positive answer to the grave problem. Hence the reason for treating the subject of the molinistic *concursus simultaneus* in the fifth chapter. Suarez reinterprets the teaching of Molina and improves upon it, for instance, he holds that it would be preferable to avoid applying the term, partial cause, to God, one should rather employ the expression, total cause. Finally Father Dumont exposes Suarez' refutations of the metaphysical and dogmatic objections to the doctrine of simultaneous *concursus*. The question whether the divine *concursus* accompanies the activity of created beings, or whether it predetermines that activity, is but one aspect of the whole problem which has taxed the ingenuity of the most acute theologians.

Professor Dumont does not decline to be charged with taking sides in the controversy. In reality he appears as a champion of Molinism, which, he asserts, has often been travestied by its opponents. It cannot be said that he has succeeded in removing the fundamental difficulties

of this truly obscure problem. At most he has defended what he regards as the more plausible opinion. He has, however, clarified the historical background of this most mysterious problem. He has given an objective exposition of the tenets of Suarez in lucid French prose, basing himself on copious quotations from the original Latin which he either paraphrases or else translates accurately. The book is provided with a choice bibliography and an index of the names of theologians. The author does not always refrain from somewhat acrid comments, and one cannot escape the impression that his work is permeated by a certain pugnacity. On the whole, however, one must regard this monograph as a substantial contribution to the history of theology.

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Varieties of American Religion: The Goal of Religion as Interpreted by Representative Exponents of Seventeen Distinctive Types of Religious Thought. Edited by Charles Samuel Braden. Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1936. viii+294 pp. $2.00.

Dr. Braden's intention for this volume was that it present a symposium by leaders of various faiths on the subject of "what religion offers to men individually and socially," and he advised the contributors to give concrete meaning to such terms as "salvation" and "mediation." Unfortunately few of the contributors took this task seriously, and their essays read for the most part like conventional sermons. Most of the Christian contributors discuss Christianity in particular rather than religion in general but emphasize the generalities of Christianity, which are shared by many churches, rather than the distinctive tenets of their respective denominations. It would be an interesting experiment to take the contributions entitled Fundamentalism, Orthodox Protestantism, Liberal Protestantism, Radical Protestantism, Barthianism, Roman Catholicism, and Mormonism and, after eliminating a few tell-tale catch-words, to ask "the general reader" to guess which essay belongs to which faith. I venture to predict a very low correlation. In one sense this symposium is a useful and enlightening undertaking, since it reveals how much the varieties of religion have in common; but the reader will be disappointed if he expects authori-

tative expositions of the distinctive faiths represented. A few contributors, as for example, George Craig Stewart, expounding Episcopal Sacramentarianism; Albert F. Gilmore, Christian Science; Leo Jung, Judaism; Horace J. Bridges, Ethical Culture; and Mark A. Barwise, Spiritualism, give excellent summaries of the essentials of their respective faiths.

The two essays which seem to me to take Dr. Braden's question most seriously are the Theosophist, Albert P. Warrington, and the Roman Catholic, Fulton J. Sheen. Both answer fairly definitely, though not critically. The contrast between these two doctrines is entertaining as well as instructive. Theosophy, interpreting salvation, not in terms of the wrath of God, but of the law of God, gives an elaborate, "occult" version of this Law as the very essence of all history, progress and morality, a romantic and richly mythological deism. The Roman Catholic, on the other hand, stakes his whole argument on the Fall and the need for regeneration, so that, though "nature settles her account with natural things here and now, the moral side of the universe has not made its last reckoning with every man on this side of the grave." According to Monsignor Sheen, Adam and Eve before the Fall possessed gifts much like those that Theosophists claim for their "masters," "immunity from disease and death; freedom from the rebellion of flesh over reason; above all, a gift of knowledge which far surpassed reason and enabled man to grasp divine truths in a far more wonderful way than that in which a telescope reveals to the eye the distant stars and planets; and a gift of power or grace which made the first man and woman not mere creatures of the handiwork of God, but God's own children, and co-heirs with Him in the Kingdom of Heaven." (Page 111.) In fact the chief difference between Theosophic moralism and Catholic redemptionism appears to be that in the former there is an endless process of fallings, risings and judgments, known as the law of Karma, whereas in the latter there is one great Fall in the beginning and one Final Judgment at the end of history. The most striking difference, however, between the moralistic and the redemptive versions of salvation is to be found, not in the contrast between Theosophy and Catholicism, but on two successive pages of Monsignor Sheen's exposition of the Last Judgment. On page 120 he writes: "For life is like a cash register, in that every account, every thought, every deed,

like every sale, is registered and recorded. And when the business of life is finally done, then God pulls from out the registry of our souls that slip of our memory on which is recorded our merits and demerits, our virtues and our vices—the basis of the judgment on which shall be decided eternal life or eternal death." On page 121 he writes: "When, therefore, God looks upon a soul in the state of Grace, He sees in it a likeness of His own nature. Just as a father recognizes his own son because of likeness of nature, so too Christ recognizes the soul in the state of Grace in virtue of resemblance to Him, and says to the soul: 'Come ye blessed of My Father: I am the natural Son, you are the adopted son. Come into the Kingdom prepared for you from all eternity.'" This contrast between a "cash register" theory of Judgment, "when every soul must balance its accounts before God," and an "adoptionist" theory, when God recognizes his image in the state of Grace, suggests profoundly different conceptions of religion which neither Theosophists nor Christians, for all the centuries they have reflected on them, have thought out very clearly.

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An Outline of Christian Worship. By W. D. MAXWELL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. 199 pp. $2.75.

Christian Worship. Edited by NATHANIEL MICKLEM. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. xi + 259 pp. $4.50.

Liturgy and Society. By A. G. HEBERT. London: Faber & Faber, 1936. 267 pp. 12/6.

Worship. By EVELYN UNDERHILL. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937. xxi + 350 pp. $3.00.

"Public Worship." By H. S. COFFIN. In *The Church through Half a Century: Essays in Honor of William Adams Brown*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936.

The revived interest in liturgy, both in Europe and to a lesser extent in America, is a healthy sign. It has brought us back to a recognition of first principles in the general panic for a united Christendom. A study of liturgy and a thorough acquaintance with the diverse forms of Christian worship is really the best introduction for those who are

concerned with the oecumenical movement. Nothing can make us realize more clearly that what divides the various denominations of Christendom is not so much diverse ideas about the nature of the Church (which only interest theologians) as the practical differences involved in worship. A Baptist cannot feel at home at an Anglo-Catholic High Mass, because the whole world of religious thought and feeling that he encounters there is strange to him. Likewise the Eastern Orthodox finds the severe tradition of Puritan worship foreign to him. The best way to grasp the fundamental problem in Church Unity is to study the practice of Christian worship, and the most fruitful approach to the problem is to appreciate, and sympathetically to enter into, the historical traditions of Christian worship.

The most successful attempt in this realm was undoubtedly Y. Brilioth's *Eucharistic Faith and Practice* (S.P.C.K., 1930, trans. by Fr. Hebert), where he gave a careful and sympathetic analysis of the ideas and actions in the different traditions of the Eucharist through the centuries. A more recent account of the development of Christian worship has been written by W. D. Maxwell, *An Outline of Christian Worship*. His work is compact and brief, but in general quite accurate. It does not make easy reading, but well serves the purpose of a general text-book in the field. It is well documented, with apt and full citations from liturgical sources. The best part is the section dealing with the Reformed Rites, on which Dr. Maxwell is an outstanding authority. His earlier book, *John Knox's Genevan Service Book 1556* (Oliver and Boyd, 1931), is the most complete and accurate account of the origins of the Calvinistic liturgies. His main thesis, as against Brightman, that the Calvinistic Rites were derived through the German translations of the Mass, and not through the mediaeval service of Prone, was ably proven.

The collection of fifteen uneven essays, published under the title *Christian Worship* for the Jubilee of Mansfield College, and edited by Pres. N. Micklem, is another recent contribution in the field. It is an authoritative, but not a technical, book and should prove of value to laymen who wish to obtain a comprehensive view of the philosophy and history of worship from the point of view of Presbyterians and Congregationalists. The studies in the Jewish Background by Prof. T. W. Manson, and in the Last Supper in the New Testament

by Prof. C. H. Dodd, are particularly valuable. Dr. Manson's criticism of the thesis, which has been currently accepted since Oesterley and Box propounded it, that the Last Supper was a *Kiddush,* is well worthy of attention (pp. 46 ff.). This is a point overlooked by Dr. Maxwell, who asserts with unqualified assurance that "the Last Supper derives from the *Kiddush*" (p. 37). Dr. Manson's clear statement that "there is no evidence for a Passover *Kiddush* which takes place twenty-four hours before the feast," has yet to be answered. It is a point with which Dr. Oesterley himself wrestled rather unsuccessfully (*The Jewish Background of the Christian Liturgy,* pp. 175 ff.). We may not agree with Dr. Manson that the case made out by Dalman, Billerbeck and Jeremias for the Last Supper as a Passover is quite so strong as he imagines (p. 47). Nevertheless, we will assent to his general conclusion that table fellowship played a very important rôle in the life of Jesus and his disciples, and that "the essential significance of the Last Supper" is "that it was the last of many fellowship meals."

An able discussion of the interpretation of the primitive Eucharist has appeared in *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses* (Jan., 1936, pp. 1-22) by Dr. O. Culmann ("La Signification de la Sainte-Cène dans le christianisme primitif"). His main point is that Paul in his interpretation of the Eucharist related a new line of thought to the religious meals of the primitive Church. This concerned the New Covenant which had been sealed by the death of Christ and foreshadowed by His Last Supper. Here Paul gave a new significance to the Eucharistic rite as, in a similar way, he had related the death and resurrection of Christ to the rite of Baptism in Romans 6. While the conception of the New Covenant can hardly have been original with Paul, he was responsible for clearly showing the relation of the death of Christ to the Last Supper and to the religious meals of the early Christians, in which the prominent idea had previously been the union of the messianic community with the Risen Lord. Dr. Culmann lays much-needed stress upon the joyful element in these primitive Christian *agapai,* showing its evident connection with the table fellowship of the resurrection appearances of Christ. That the most vital factor in these early Christian feasts was the sense of the Risen Lord and the hope of His immediate return in glory can hardly be disputed. The eschatological element in the accounts of the Last

Supper is a point to which Dr. Dodd refers in his essay in *Christian Worship* (p. 71).

The essay on Luther in *Christian Worship* by Dr. James Moffatt is both interesting and incisive, and is by far the best brief account of the subject to be found anywhere. He shows how the extreme didactic interest of Luther tended to detract from his liturgical productions, but he points out that the intimate relation between the Word and the Sacraments was determinative for the Reformer's view of worship. The chapter on Calvin by Pres. J. S. Whale makes clear the stern opposition with which Calvin viewed the separation of the Liturgy of the Word from that of the Sacrament. Following Dr. Maxwell's thesis, and the new work that has been done on the liturgical thought of Calvin, he remarks that "it was his life-long desire to restore the ancient practice of weekly communion of all the people and to abolish the mediaeval custom of lay communion only once or twice a year."

It is this corporate sense of Christian worship which is the basic theme of Fr. Hebert's book, *Liturgy and Society*. Although written from an Anglo-Catholic standpoint and directed particularly to the needs of the English Church, this book is challenging to all Christians who are deeply concerned with the nature of modern worship. It is a rare book in that it has something to say of vital and enduring importance for the Church today. He stresses the corporate act of worship in its relation to every phase of Christian life and he emphasizes the interpretation of the Parish Eucharist as the common offering of the Christian community. This latter theme is worked out in relation to the primitive liturgies in an excellent article ("L'ideé d'oblation dans les liturgies primitives") by the same author in the October number of *Oecumenica* (S.P.C.K.).

In *Liturgy and Society* Fr. Hebert has an illuminating section on the modern Liturgical Movement (pp. 125-38), and the translation of the "liturgical sermon" from the Klosterneuburg magazine, *Lebe mit der Kirche*, shows the richness and simplicity that the movement has brought with it.

Fr. Hebert's book deals with such a variety of problems relating to modern Christianity that his title may seem to many misleading. Yet it is fitting in that his work is really concerned with showing the centrality of the Liturgy for Christianity and in stressing that the

manifold relationships of the Christian life only find their deepest meaning in the corporate act of worship. So it is that he has chapters on "Christianity and Art," "Dogma," "Faith and Life" and "Social Idealism," all of which attempt to relate phases of Christian life and thought to the central act of worship. The pictures in the book give an added emphasis to his thesis. Not only are they photographic reproductions of great beauty, but they are a kind of miniature history of Christian art, showing what can and has been done, not only in the past but in the present, to express Christian devotion in art. The photographs of modern churches are challenging to our unimaginative reproductions of Gothic in America, and the statue Our Lady of the Lily is of rare beauty.

We may not altogether agree with Fr. Hebert's point of view, and we may feel that his harsh denunciations of "modernism" are too extreme, yet his book is of challenging and vital interest to all who have come to realize that the great deficiency in modern Christianity is its lack of corporate worship and a sense of corporate Christian life.

Another significant book on the meaning and practice of worship has appeared from the pen of Evelyn Underhill, *Worship*. It is divided into two parts which deal respectively with the theory and history of Christian Worship. The historical part is, on the whole, accurate and well-balanced, though the author's feeling and understanding of Catholic worship is deeper than her appreciation of Protestant forms. She does, however, emphasize the fact that the later mediaeval piety, with its cult of the Reserved Sacrament, tended to become highly individualistic (a point also noted by Fr. Hebert, p. 120), while the sense of corporate worship, with its vernacular and hymn singing, was one of the primary contributions of the Reformers to Liturgy (*Worship*, pp. 261, 279, 283).

In the first part of her book she has made a helpful and clear analysis of the different elements involved in the act of worship, and her chapters on the nature of various liturgical forms show insight and balance. This is particularly true of the chapter on the significance of the Eucharist (pp. 138 ff.). While Miss Underhill's work cannot be said to add anything particularly new to the study of liturgy, she has well succeeded in writing a vital and interpretative account of the liturgical tradition of Christianity and her book will provide the

educated layman and student with an excellent introduction to the subject.

A survey of Public Worship in America during the last fifty years has been given by Pres. H. S. Coffin in one of the series of essays, *The Church through Half a Century*, published in honour of Dr. William Adams Brown. Dr. Coffin's account ably summarizes the main development in architecture during the last fifty years, the conduct of services and the changes of emphasis in prayers and preaching. The effect of psychological study upon worship had both a value and a grave defect. It did eradicate many "unhealthy forms of expressing man's fellowship with God" (p. 191), but it brought with it a subjectivity which was deplorable. Happily this is now being remedied. The main comparison of worship today with that of fifty years ago Dr. Coffin summarizes as a "returning sense of God's sovereignty and righteousness," and a "desire for austerity," rather than "the geniality prized a generation ago" (p. 204). The "otherness" of God is being stressed, and Christians no longer want to "wallow in their own emotions."

However, what this survey does clearly show is that great advances made by the Continental Liturgical Movement have affected American Church Life hardly at all. Though a slavish imitation of European manners should be nauseating to the independent American mind (which, alas, is far from true in its passion for Gothic), at least the fervour for simple and sincere liturgical reform might be caught from the Continental Movement. Much Protestant Church life in America certainly suffers from a lack of historical knowledge of the liturgical tradition of Christianity and a sense of corporate worship as a common *act* of vital moment. Passive listening to choirs and sermons is a strange contrast to the *actio* of the modern Mass or the primitive Christian Eucharist.

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The Interpretation of History. By Paul Tillich. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. 284 pp. $2.50.

The wave of interest in the philosophy of history has broken on American shores. In Europe the effort to interpret history was made not only by dilettantes like Spengler, but also by such a sober and

careful scientist as Troeltsch. They produced a large scale frontal attack upon the problem which had been a "sleeping dog" since Hegel. In America the approach to history has been an oblique one. It was made by historians (Robinson) or theologians (Mathews, *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*) or, when attempted by philosophers, was made *via* the history of philosophy (Mead, *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*). Whatever the reason for the silence—sheer difficulty, as Professor Barrett suggests, is a possible one—the translation of Professor Paul Tillich's essays (along with the recent publication of N. Berdjaiev's work) may stimulate American philosophers to try a direct approach to the problem.

The Interpretation of History is the translation of a number of essays, to which Tillich has prefixed a biographical chapter in which he both recounts and interprets his own development in relation to the life situation in which his thought matured. In Germany Tillich was a philosopher, a political theorist and worker, and a theologian. The three parts of his work reflect this division of his life, for the essays are grouped under three headings: the philosophical, political, and theological categories of history.

It is difficult to know where to begin a review of his work. He reveals himself to us as a borderline individual occupying, among others, the boundaries between two temperaments, city and country, middle class (with a feudal coloring), and proletariat, theology and philosophy, church and society, religion and culture, Luthernism and Marxism, Idealism and Marxism, home and alien land. To take this borderline situation too seriously, however, is to misunderstand Tillich. His total work reveals him, I believe, to be primarily a Christian theologian, yet it is just his ability to get out beyond himself into the philosophical and political world which has made him, in my opinion, the most significant and interesting theologian of Germany in the last two decades. More than any other Christian theologian within the ken of the reviewer, he has taken seriously the problem of knowledge, has come to grips with Marxism, and has tried to make a science of theology. But to say that he has put forth this titanic creative effort is not to say that he has succeeded in bridging the gap between theology and philosophy, Marxism, and science, or superseded them.

If by a philosophy of history is meant the extracting of a pattern from the tangled mass of events, or ordering the array of facts of

human experience, then the present work is no philosophy of history. Tillich is not interested in a pattern beside which other patterns can be placed. He is interested in truth, in the key that is essential to all possible patterns. A beginning with the objective facts of human experience can lead, according to Tillich, only to another pattern, a confession of defeat, a going down before relativism. Troeltsch, in all his work and finally in his Oxford lectures in 1923, tried that road and emerged with the idea of "truth for us" but with no ultimate idea of history. Where Troeltsch failed, Tillich, his student, would succeed. He begins with a simplifying view of the world and man with which he approaches and categorizes the facts of history. His philosophy of history is the effort to validate that view, achieved by a "phenomenological intuition."

For Tillich man is not a psycho-physical fact in the midst of other facts in an on-going world. He is rather an aspect of the finite (relative) world directed toward the infinite (absolute) world. His reliance upon the *Gestalt* theory is obvious, but he tries to get beyond it to a transcending apperception of the inmost nature of the world processes. It is, then, his distinction between finite and infinite, relative and absolute, that constitutes his starting point—a point he shares with the currently influential theologians of contemporary Germany. What he does with the idea is what makes Tillich more intriguing.

To say that Tillich is merely a theologian or a mystic is beside the point and evades the seriousness of his challenge to contemporary thought, for—to begin with philosophy—it is his contention that philosophy ought (in the sense of *must* if it is to get anywhere) to contain a theological element. He has worked out, therefore, what he call the theonomous character of knowledge. His contention (not new, to be sure) is that ideas have an inner dynamic which ever directs them to, but never identifies them with, the absolute, that these ideas are in their origin not logical, nor based on logic, but are born out of real living in this existing world. They are not static tiles in an intellectual mosaic. Ideas "leap" and hence men of ideas are not basically rational.

In Western thought Tillich sees two main strands: one comes from Descartes, the minor strand comes from Boehme. In Descartes and the greater part of the classical tradition from Descartes the mosaic theory of ideas is worked out, while in Boehme (and partly in Fichte,

Hegel, Schelling and possibly part of Pragmatism) the dynamic theory of ideas is exemplified. This latter theory Tillich challenges philosophy to take seriously and regard as a valid theory of ideas. From this point of view events as we know them in series or in contexts are of little account. Ideas or events—so far as their historical character is concerned—are not related to other ideas to form a pattern; they are related ultimately to the Unconditioned. It is the inner meaning of ideas, their leaping character that counts. And yet, paradoxically, men stand in the midst of a this-worldly existence; their ideas, however, when historical are ultimately determined not by existence but by the absolute. Thus a man of ideas in his directedness toward the absolute is not mechanically determined by facts; he is free to face absolute reality and in the moment of decision may be "free." His actions then acquire meaning. But what meaning? How can this meaning be made clear? How can it be communicated? To this we get no answer. This is the other limit of reason, and no criterion is offered by which a meaningful action or idea may be distinguished from an arbitrary one. It cannot be tested in experience, for experience cannot be the test of an act with a transcendental reference. Then where can it be tested?

In the political realm Tillich's application of his philosophy becomes most interesting. Here his two great foils are Hegel and Marx. Though Hegel saw the dynamic nature of ideas, he finally succumbed to a static view and a philosophy of essence in which the idea came to rest. It destroyed its own inner infinity by becoming finite and rational in the concept of the *Volksgeist*. In Marx it became static, rational and finite in the concept of "productive society." Tillich opposes them, not by setting up next to them, but by extracting their utopian character and injecting into them the idea of "freedom and fate" which keeps them fluid, irrational, non-absolute, creative, dynamic, containing truth but not exhausting it.

In the realm of religion Tillich applies the same procedure to state and church, church and culture. No one term of these combinations may raise itself to absolute power lest the Idea, which is dynamic and inexhaustible, be arbitrarily dragged into the finite world by some one person or institution with an open or veiled claim to absoluteness.

All through his work Tillich insists that only living beings in the midst of social existence have the possibility of "history." History,

however, is not social (a rational concept); it is freedom in relation to the absolute. Human experience becomes "historical," then, only when seen in the light of the transcendent meaning which comes from the Unconditioned.

Many unkind things have been said about the Absolute of Idealism which might be transferred to Tillich's Unconditioned. Nevertheless one ought to try to understand it, if possible. Obviously the idea is not meant to convey complete transcendence, for Tillich is opposed to Karl Barth and holds that the Idea becomes manifest in actual human living. It is not the not-yet-conditioned. It is not the to-be-conditioned. Is it the unconditionable aspect of existence? That is to be doubted, for Tillich insists that though it is manifested it remains inviolably transcendent. It is not objectively existent and yet is related to the world. How? By projection? Certainly not, for then it is subject to recall and change, i.e., human conditioning. And so the Unconditioned and the derived ideas of "freedom and fate" and "freedom and meaning" remain irrational, or, as I believe, just simply unclarified ideas. They must be approached, says Tillich, by the method of "phenomenological intuition," but this most basic concept likewise remains without a content that can be communicated and verified.

Where then is history? One might perhaps get at it if it were pointed out to us. Tillich's answer is that it may be in animals, men, or even in angels, but doubts that it is outside of human beings. But not all men have history, only those who "realize in their minds what meaning is" (pp. 253-4). This is as close as we come to a solution. When Tillich tries to put that into rational terms, he says, "The new that is produced by freedom is meaningful reality." Here then is apparently a clue to meaning, history, and the Unconditioned. We have also a new definition of God. The Unconditioned would seem to be (with apologies to Professor Shailer Mathews) the novelty-producing power of the universe. But one must hasten to qualify, and say not mere novelty. One has still to ask about the content of novelty. Here, however, the road disappears again in either profundity or plain obscurity. The reader must decide.

When the way emerges again it is in the realm of theology and the field of symbolism. Tillich begins by setting up the concept of the "center of history." Novelty and meaning are referred to the transcendent, all-comprehensive meaning, but in human affairs this mean-

ing manifested becomes the "center of history" and is symbolized by "Christ" (not the historical Jesus). Despite his going beyond himself into the deeps of socialism and Marxism, Tillich could not swing clear of his Christian moorings, much of which he himself felt to be dead timber. He did swing clear of orthodoxy, but he could not find any historical meaning in the modern world. National Socialism as "paganism" sent him back to Christianity, instead of causing him to go beyond it to a trans-Christian, humanistic, universal yet dynamic concept of mankind, to be realized as an event in a "well expected" future.

If "Christ" as the "center of history" is only symbolic history the question which persistently breaks through all thinking in terms of symbols is: Where is real history? To this Tillich's answer is clear. We know only that it is in nature, for "pure spirit is an empty abstraction" (p. 281). But in nature "we do not know where real history is!" But life is "decision and fulfillment." What is its content? Again we are referred to the Absolute, for "conditioned fulfilment is menaced by the threat of meaninglessness, by the threat that history will end negatively, that the demon of the past will conquer every possible future, that all events, deeds, meanings which belong to history will finally be drowned in the infinite ocean of nothingness." So far as I can see, the concept of the "center of history" is devoid of all human content, and the moment of "decision and fulfilment" is a sort of mathematical point. But more, in insisting that history shall end positively, Tillich seems to me to be seriously limiting the Unconditioned, preventing, if I understand him correctly, a cosmic suicide. But this is "humanism" with a vengeance! Here seems to me to be the "essence" of the matter. Here are "rest" and finality. Stripped of all difficult (and in my opinion outworn) theological terminology Tillich suggests that the meaning of life is a transcendent hope and faith which borders on, and becomes abiding confidence in, a free life lived in an open social and cosmic environment, and that salvation is assured to some, guaranteed in a "phenomenological intuition."

We can now examine Tillich's romanticism, mysticism, and intuition. He rejects the humanistic line of philosophy since Descartes, because of its lack of immediacy, in favor of Boehme where he finds "substance in immediacy." This substance, mythological in Boehme, has, as we saw, remained mythological in Tillich or become the empty

concept of the "center of history." Two things in comment: First, Seillière has pointed out that Tillich's mythical romanticism can be humanly dangerous. Tillich could boldly escape this criticism by saying that, from the point of view of experience, life is like that. But he philosophically guards himself repeatedly by affirming that no person or institution ought to become absolute. But if decision is real and ultimately unqualified, as Tillich also holds, then it is difficult to see how he can escape Seillière's criticism. Second, the humanistic main line has, to be sure, emphasized method, but it has not killed immediacy, which is very much alive in scientific and social imagination, in the genuine hypothesis. It has emphasized the experimental check in place of the inner check. How can, however, the apperception of transcendental meaning be checked against illusion? Only by indecision or more revelation. How check the latter? We here run into a series. Since the way of rational content is blocked, as we have seen, we must, if we would escape, make a romantic decision. We have either to admit the co-validity of the experimental check, or use it, as Tillich does, in a subordinate role, and cling romantically to a decision determined by a transcendental meaning whose content remains hidden in the Unconditioned.

With that we come finally to the claim of the Unconditioned, which, according to Tillich, exercises a divine negation over man to which he can only say "yes." If the Unconditioned is not "pure" spirit, which Tillich rejects as an empty abstraction, it must somehow be involved in the cosmos. But historically man as a religious individual has always refused to bow before any ultimate divine "no," and, historically, at least, the unconditioned God has not always been "implied" in religion. If the Unconditioned produces or allows malaria, man says "no" to the Unconditioned. Evil is evil, the more vividly and embarrassingly so if the religious object is the Unconditioned.

Finding that the Greek world failed, and modern man also, according to his judgment, in the World War, Tillich gives approval to the movement of late antiquity, intensified by Christianity, which prized and magnified the infinite and gave it theological status. Greek life emphasized the finite, but developed no experimental method. Christianity gave, at first, positive human, then dialectic content to the infinite and made dogma its method. Modern man gives due recognition to infinity, but without any merely dialectical backward look

(that is Marxism's overwhelming advantage over Christianity) retains his faith in man and in the experimental method. He does so not blatantly, but with reasonable dignity; not despairingly or half-heartedly, but with the full knowledge that as a natural human being he can have satisfying, but not therefore enervating, human experiences. (Despair too can become enervating, clever, or negatively urbane.) So long as that is true, historically, and philosophically valid, it is possible flatly to contradict Tillich's thesis that "there is no approach to religion except theological ontology," and to affirm that it is the natural (conditioned and unconditioned), the social, the human that "gives being to the being." Such being can actually be stated in terms of natural, social and human life and, perchance, amplified in the ongoing life-process demanding real decisions.

Tillich's approach seems to me, however, to be an empty cosmic dance of "yes" and "no" in which human meanings are sacrificed to the Unconditioned, and lost in an absolute mystical blackness from which they never return. In this approach the idea of Transcendent Meaning is, I believe, only the central concept of his Protestant ideology, and suffers from the fatal defect that it can—to use one of Tillich's most powerful arguments—be successfully ignored. The experience of actual human and natural relationships tested in the crucible of social living is the guarantee of the reality of history.

Only time can decide whether Tillich, and those who share his view, will succeed in revitalizing Protestantism and its symbols. In any case, I venture the opinion that his work is the most thorough-going, stimulating and powerful Protestant effort to come to terms with Marxism and scientific, humanistic naturalism.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

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What Is the Faith? By NATHANIEL MICKLEM. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1937. 227 pp.

This is a valuable and significant book. For whatever we may think of it, there is a trend among theologians in the Protestant world in the direction of the older systems associated with the names of Calvin and Luther, and indeed with the names of Aquinas and Augustine. Dr. Micklem, who is the principal of Mansfield College, one of the non-conformist theological schools in Oxford, has turned away from

the liberalism which marked his contribution to *Mysterium Christi*, and is now on the side of orthodoxy in his approach to the question, "What *is* Christianity, after all?"

The reviewer remembers his amazement a few years ago, when a friend showed him a pamphlet by Dr. Micklem, published a short time after *Mysterium Christi* came out. It was a sort of statement of conversion: Dr. Micklem seemed to be going Barthian. This well-written, scholarly book indicates that he stopped short of the Barthian position. But he is on that side of the fence, so to say.

The purpose of the present volume is the definition of the traditional Christian faith as it has actually been believed, whether or not one chooses to believe it today. Having reached such a definition, the author would then have us view certain doctrines regularly associated with the central faith, and consider their relationship to the gospel. He would discuss the problem, whether the form in which the inherited faith has been received may not be altered while the substance remains the same. He would take into account the attitude towards Church and sacraments which follows from this fundamental set of *credenda*.

Needless to say, the treatment is clear, penetrating, and stimulating, even if it is not always satisfactory. Dr. Micklem has made one point, and made it well. The all too frequent attempt to "re-state" the historic faith without any real acquaintance with what actually is the historic faith has had unfortunate, not to say disastrous, results. If you are translating from German into English, you must know, and know thoroughly, both German and English. The trouble has been that our theological translators have known the English very well indeed, but have not bothered themselves always to learn the German; or to drop the metaphor, they have known a great deal about modern thought, philosophy and science, but have failed to have a similarly deep knowledge of the things which the ancient creeds, confessions, dogmas, doctrines and theologies were trying to express in their own inadequate language.

Here, we feel, Dr. Micklem has rendered a great service. He has called attention to the deep things in the old theologies, even if he has stated them in ways which some of us find unnecessarily rigid and even untrue because of their decisive statement. For instance, he has made it clear that Christianity is not interested in a God-inspired man

(if that is all he is), or in a purely ethical teaching, or in a mere reflection of God in a human life; it is concerned with God-in-human life, with a person who is quite truly human and also quite truly divine. We may reject the belief; but we cannot deny that it is essential Christianity to assert it. And it is our task to re-state it in our own terms.

The reviewer's difficulty is that he feels that Dr. Micklem has not merely restored the balance of theology, but has gone to the extreme of throwing over what has been learned from liberal theology of the last half-century. Once again he would present us with a Christ who is almost totally unrelated to his background; once again revelation becomes a "blinding flash," rather than a revealing light; once again the almost-Apollinarian notion that the place of our Lord's human ego was taken by the divine Word and that he has therefore no human "personality," are presented to us. This is not even sound Catholic theology, we venture to assert; it may be Reformation theology, in certain aspects. And is it not possible to maintain the fundamental traditional emphases on Christ's real divinity, real atoning work, and real presence in his Church, without forgetting his equally real congruity with other revelation, his intimate relationship to those whom he called his brethren, and his appearance in a world in which he was no stranger, for it was his own? We wish that Dr. Micklem could make his own the Logos theology, through which the uniqueness, definitive nature and supremacy of the historic Incarnation may be maintained, and also the wide sweep of divine activity of an incarnational quality may be preserved.

It is interesting to note that in discussing that which is "necessary to the story," i.e., that which is essential to Christianity, Dr. Micklem concedes that the virgin birth (as a physiological fact) and the empty tomb are irrelevant. They may indeed be accepted, but acceptance or rejection does not imply that one is unsound on the Incarnation and the Resurrection doctrines, which are essential to Christianity. There are other points equally important and equally significant, coming from one who takes our author's present position. He is a traditional Christian, certainly; but we might better write "neo-traditional."

A similar critique of the older liberalism, but along rather more congenial lines, was made in a little book by Alan Richardson, entitled "The Redemption of Modernism," published last summer. We wish

that Dr. Micklem had realized so well and stated so clearly the true contributions of the last half-century. But the present volume will do much good, if it is taken as a corrective and not as a balanced, constructive statement of the Christian faith for the new age in which we live.

W. Norman Pittenger

The General Theological Seminary

We Beheld His Glory. By Nicholas Arseniev. Translated from the German by Mary Anita Ewer. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1936. xx + 220 pp. $3.00.

In this volume, Prof. Arseniev discusses those tendencies in modern Christianity which emphasize the Resurrection of Christ and the value of the Sacraments in an objective sense, the sense of primitive Christian realism. By this the author means a frank belief in these events of the Resurrection and Ascension as actions which took place at a definite time in a definite place, and which resulted in the establishment of the early Church as it was traditionally supposed to be. In that respect the author is inflexible. He sincerely believes in the sacramental life and the experiences that flow out of it. This is the foundation of the book.

On this basis he examines briefly but thoroughly all those tendencies which he considers important in the life of Protestanism, Orthodoxy, Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism, and in the Oecumenical Movement. His sympathies are frankly with those movements which come nearest to the spirit of the early Church as Orthodoxy has always conceived it. It is however to be noticed that his work stresses chiefly the Resurrection and its results, far more than it does the doctrine of the Incarnation and those movements which flow directly out of that.

This has an interesting result, Berdiayev, Bulgakov and the Russian Theological Seminary of St. Serge are not mentioned. There is also no reference to Vladimir Soloviev, who stands as the transition between Khomiakov and the modern group. It would perhaps be an exaggeration to say that Dr. Arseniev is opposed to their teaching. He is certainly more objective, more mundane, if we may so speak, more willing to admit the reality and qualities of this present world than they are. There is a mystical spirit, but it is the spirit of the simple

believer, rather than of the speculative theologian who is endeavoring to create a new theory of the universe.

It is also of interest to note that it is only in the teaching of the Anglican Church that he finds this extreme emphasis laid on the Incarnation, and he might have added that some of the men whom he mentions are also the ones most influenced by the Paris School.

As regards Russia and radical sociological teachings, he is plainly hostile to the Soviet Government and he is equally critical of the "socialistic and Utopia-oriented groups within Anglo-Catholicism" (p. 161). There is much to be considered in his remarks, but all such passages are only by-products of a volume which rests on the general faith in the Risen Christ. This is the special aspect of Orthodox theology and mysticism, for it is more marked here than in the West. Dr. Arseniev sees a growing interest in the West in this aspect of the faith and it is this quality that encourages him to believe that modern Christians in these days of trouble are joining with the early Christians of the days of the persecutions in the knowledge that Christ has conquered death once and for all.

It is an excellent book for those who believe in the Sacramental theory, and it will be worthy of consideration by all others, for Dr. Arseniev is a wide scholar and well deserves the encomia of the introduction by Dr. Leiper. It is a shame to point out errors, but the spelling of the name of the great Russian theologian Chomiakov is unfortunate. The usual English spelling is Khomiakov. This and one or two other names show the influence of the German transliteration. However such defects are minor, and we can only give high praise to both the author and the translator, and trust that the work will be recognized for what it is—another example of the capacity of Orthodoxy to understand and evaluate and comment upon Western Christianity with wisdom, sympathy, and love.

Clarence A. Manning

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BOOK NOTES

The Ras Shamra Mythological Texts. By James A. Montgomery and Zellig S. Harris. Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society. Vol. IV. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935. 134 pp.

In 1929 two French archaeologists, C. Schaeffer and G. Chenet, began excavating at Ras Shamra (the ancient Ugarit) on the coast of North Syria. In the course of the next few years they uncovered a large number of clay tablets dating from the 14th century B.C., among which were half a hundred written in a hitherto unknown cuneiform alphabet (not syllabic writing). This script was soon deciphered by four scholars working independently, the German Bauer, the French Virolleaud and Dhorme, and the American Albright, and the language was recognized as a Canaanite dialect closely related to biblical Hebrew. The texts are mostly of two kinds—ritual texts and literary texts, the latter containing parts of a mythological epic, now generally referred to as the Poem of Mot and Aleyn-Baal. These fragments of the most ancient West-Semitic religious literature known to us were first published by Virolleaud in successive numbers of the periodical *Syria,* and the rapidly growing literature of exegesis was scattered in an uncomfortably large number of journals and monographs, which made it difficult for the student of biblical and Semitic civilization to orient himself in this new field. But now, thanks to the scholarly pioneering of Prof. Montgomery and Dr. Harris, we have an excellent preliminary collection of the most important literary texts known up to the spring of 1935 when the book was ready for publication (the authors were unaware that there was soon to appear, in 1936, a similar work by H. L. Ginsberg of Palestine, containing the ritual as well as mythological texts, but as this admirable edition is written in Hebrew it will not be as accessible as the English work to the majority of western scholars).

Montgomery and Harris have given a brief sketch of the discovery of the tablets, a discussion of their grammar and orthography and of their literary form, a synopsis of their contents, a bibliography and, finally, the texts themselves in Hebrew transliteration, followed by a vocabulary.

The importance of this Ras Shamra religious literature for the study of Canaanite and Hebrew religion and philosophy is hardly to be overestimated. In the few years since their first publication in *Syria* a number of important articles have been written to show how many of the ancient West-Semitic cult practices, literary motifs and religious terms have survived in the Hebrew Bible and even in Hellenistic-Oriental literature (e.g., Sanchuniathon).

The authors are to be congratulated and thanked for placing in the hands of scholars such carefully and helpfully prepared materials for what has already become a new and exciting province of ancient oriental studies.

Ralph Marcus

The Story of the Relics of the Passion. By H. M. Gillett. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1935. xvi + 142 pp. 4/6.

In his preface the author modestly states that it is not his purpose to prove the authenticity of the relics, since that has been undertaken by abler scholars than himself, but rather to make it easier for those interested to follow their history. By means of notes, bibliography, and illustrations he makes his text a lucid and valuable guidebook. He assembles a great deal of interesting evidence for the authenticity of the relics, derived, not from documents which may well be forgeries, but from the objects themselves—a sort of internal, "archeological" evidence which, whether really evidence or not, is an important element in the history. However these Relics of the Passion were assembled (or fabricated), in the early days of the Church's power under Constantine, their subsequent history has been full of romance and adventure. Fragments of the True Cross, and spines from the Crown of Thorns, are found in sacred shrines all over Europe, and were the highly valued gifts made to each other by popes and kings and emperors. For the fragment of the True Cross acquired by St. Louis of France was built the most magnificent of all "reliquaries," the Sainte Chapelle at Paris. It is interesting to note that the Church merely *permits* the veneration of relics, but "in no case is any relic required to be accepted *de fide* by the faithful."

M. B.

L'Église russe devant le thomisme. By E. Denissoff. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1936. 69 pp.

This is a slight book, but in it the author as a devout Russian who has accepted the supremacy of the Holy See, offers perhaps the only hopeful method for a reunion of the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Churches (especially the Church of Russia). This is the restoration to importance and consideration of St. John Damascene, who in the eighth century reworked the field of Christian theology, and whose work undoubtedly served as a model and an inspiration to St. Thomas Aquinas and the other scholastics of the West. The author believes that, if this is done, the Orthodox can be led to a proper appreciation of the later Western developments, and so the intellectuals of the two rites can be brought together, "Orthodox by opposition to philosophic paganism, and Catholic by its character of universality" (p. 66).

There is much to be said for this idea, and the author summarizes his position briefly but fairly. On the other hand, it may also be argued that St. Thomas Aquinas was not a complete and full interpreter and developer of the ideas of St. John Damascene and the other thinkers of the time. Undoubtedly in the answer to this question lies much of the intellectual difference between the two Churches.

This same idea was launched by Peter Mogila in the seventeenth century at Kiev, at the period when the entire Orthodox Church was

intellectually most subjected to Western thought. Since then, and especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there has been a reworking and a reconsideration of the philosophy of Mogila and a steadily increasing tendency for the Orthodox to continue on the lines of St. John Damascene and his contemporaries without passing through the Western channel of development.

The author naturally stresses the rôle of Vladimir Soloviov in this connection, and he gives good sketches of Skovoroda, of Leo Tolstoy and of Spir. They fit into his general plan of approach. Perhaps Gogol, Khomyakov, and Dostoyevsky were more important in the development of Russian Christian thought, but they would not serve the purpose of the author. Yet a solution which ignores their work in Russian theology and philosophy is far too simple a solution to be at once accepted. Perhaps a deeper study of St. John Damascene and the Greek Fathers might lead to a reunion in which the modern Orthodox thought would serve as a greater foil to Thomism that the present author believes. However, it is most interesting and valuable to have the influence and importance of St. John Damascene so clearly stated. It emphasizes the fact that hitherto we have too completely neglected both his work and that of the scholars and thinkers of Constantinople and of the Byzantine Empire during the last millennium of its existence. The study of this period would undoubtedly help the scholars and thinkers of all branches of the Christian Church.

C. A. M.

Swedenborg und die übersinnliche Welt. By H. de Geymüller. Stuttgart-Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1936. 395 pp. RM 8.50.

There are several interesting facts in connection with this German edition of *Swedenborg et les phénomènes psychiques*, which appeared in 1935 with a preface by L. B. de Beaumont, formerly professor at the University of Dublin. The German edition contains a preface and an appendix by Hans Driesch. Both prefaces express the feeling that the time is now ripe for a serious consideration of the problems presented by the life and work of Emanuel Swedenborg, "the Swedish Seer." And this is true because two fields of research have now so far developed in method and scientific attitude that the data is at hand by means of which these phenomena can be understood. The first of these is the field of abnormal psychology, which is more or less outside the scope of this book. One cannot help but feel that a more thorough knowledge of the present status of this science would have been of inestimable value to the author. However, it is the second, the findings of research in the field of psychic phenomena, which concerns M. de Geymüller. And he is right in his contention that the serious attempts at psychical research should and must be brought to bear, both on the strange aspects of Swedenborg's own

personality, with its undoubted flair for supernormal experience, and upon the system of thought which he produced as a result of these experiences. In other words, the real problem is, what is this "spiritual world" which he describes in such a wealth of detail?

It seems ungracious to pick flaws in so valuable a work, but is difficult to understand why the author devoted so much space to the doctrine of reincarnation, which plays no part in either the system of Swedenborg nor in that of the Spiritualists, whose teachings concerning the afterlife are derived from him. The author seems to confuse the Theosophists with the Spiritualists. Swedenborg himself dismissed the doctrine of reincarnation with a psychological explanation.

One of the most valuable parts of the book is the appendix by Hans Driesch, which gives a brief and lucid summary of the various psychic phenomena, and their present status in psychic and psychological research.

M. B.

The Return to Religion. By HENRY C. LINK. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. 181 pp.

In this short, popular book the author, a consulting psychologist, describes his "return to religion" after a long period of agnosticism, and attempts to show how religion can and should be the integrating factor in the development of personality. While one might be inclined to agree with a great deal the writer has to say about religion as a factor in the development of character, there is an undue emphasis placed on the purely utilitarian consequences of religious belief, so much so, that one can not escape the impression that, for the author, religion is primarily a helpful technique, and, secondarily only, an attitude toward the universe and experience.

The worship of reason is castigated, and the decline of American character ascribed to it. An implication of this point of view is that education should be authoritarian rather than liberal in character. "Liberalism is the result of an indiscriminate releasing of a person from the traditions and restraints of the past without substituting an adequate set of restraints or ideals for the future." One can not help detecting in the writer's religious philosophy glimmerings of the anti-intellectualism of contemporary totalitarianism, with its insistence on character development, self-discipline and subordination to something higher than mere personal convenience. Shotwell's remarks, from a different context, might well be applied in criticism: "There is no salvation in that sickly obscurantism which attempts to evade realities by confusing itself about them. Safety lies only in clarity and the struggle for the light. . . . The hope must lie in following reason, not in thwarting it."

HENRY J. WEGROCKI

Religion, superstition et criminalité: Essai philosophique sur la criminalité superstitieuse. By MAURICE DUVAL. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1935. 380 pp. 35 fr.

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